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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This
the Fourth

is an appeal from a final

Judicial

District

Court

on

judgment

entered

by

the 27th of October,

1987 (Record 140-143), and jurisdiction is conferred upon this
Court

pursuant

to Rule

3 of

the Rules

of

the Utah

Supreme

Court.
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW
Plaintiffs Fitzgerald filed a complaint

(Record 1-16)

for slander of title to remove two notices of interest recorded

by

the

Counterclaim

defendants.

The

(Record 31-36).

defendants

filed

an Answer

and

The case was tried by the Court

sitting without a jury on October 24, 1985.

Further hearings

were heard on October 24, 1986, November 6, 1986, and September 18, 1987.

The trial court entered judgment

(Addendum No.

1) removing the notices of interest, but did not award damages, and ordering the plaintiffs Fitzgerald to deliver deeds to
real property to defendants Corbett and Gurr and to five purchasers of properties from Corbett and Gurr who were not parties to the action.

The court also entered Amended

Findings

of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Addendum 2 ) .
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Is

the

1982, enforceable?

Settlement

Agreement

of

September

10,

2.

Were

the provisions

of the Settlement

Agreement

requiring Fitzgeralds to honor past sales of Corbett and Gurr
barred by the doctrine of res judicata?
3.

Is

the

Settlement

Agreement

of

September

10,

1982, vague and ambiguous, and thus unenforceable?
4.

Did the trial court err in ordering the delivery

of deeds to third parties and to counterclaimants Corbett and
Gurr?
5.

Did the trial court err in failing to award dam-

ages for the slander of title?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is the third time that litigation between plaintiffs, Fitzgerald, and defendants, Corbett and Gurr, have come
before the Supreme Court.
this Court,

Corbett

The first two times it came before

and Gurr appeared

appellants;

this time, Fitzgeralds

appellants.

To avoid

this

will

writer

as the plaintiffs and

appear

as plaintiffs and

the confusion between the designations,

refer

to

the

parties

by

their

surnames,

"Fitzgeralds11 meaning Leland A. Fitzgerald and Helen Fitzgerald,

and

"Corbett

and

Gurr"

meaning

Boyd

Corbett

and

Keith

Gurr.
The facts and issues in this case are interwoven with
the prior litigation.

Therefore, this statement of facts must

of necessity provide background for the issues raised by this
appeal.
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Commencing
quiring

property

sellers.

in

entered

January.

Cedar

By February

ments were
Gurr.

in

1977. Fitzgeralds

Valley.

Utah,

1. 1977. the first

from

began

a variety

contractual

into between Fitzgeralds

acof

agree-

and Corbett

and

A somewhat lengthy description of the business dealings

between the parties is set forth in the Memorandum Decision in
the first litigation (Exhibit No. 10. Addendum No. 3 ) .
dealings

included

Earnest Money Receipts

and Offers

Those

to Pur-

chase. Uniform Real Estate Contracts, and Options, several in
number.

The

parties

amounts owed under

came

into

suit

over

payments

and

the various agreements, and the purported

exercise of the options, and
menced

dispute

against

the

Court. Civil No. 50,224.

in 1981. Corbett

Fitzgeralds

and Gurr com-

in the Fourth

District

the matter was tried before Judge J.

Robert Bullock, sitting without a jury.

On May 4, 1982, Judge

Bullock

(Exhibit

rendered

a Memorandum Decision

10. Addendum

3).
On May 17. 1982. Corbett and Gurr filed a notice of
appeal

from

No. 18529.

that Memorandura Decision,

in Supreme Court

On June 25. 1982. Judge Bullock entered

on the Memorandum Decision

(Exhibit 1, Addendum 4 ) .

case

Judgment
On June

29, 1982, Corbett and Gurr filed an additional notice of appeal in Supreme Court case No. 18594.
The
ment

judgment

entered

by Judge Bullock awarded

judg-

in favor of Corbett and Gurr against Fitzgeralds in the

-3-

amount of $4,709.96

(paragraph 1, Judgment, Addendum 4), but

ruled that Corbett and Gurr had no interest in the properties
described in the judgment.

On September 9, 1982, Fitzgeralds

gave Corbett and Gurr credit on a payment past due on a contract dated September 1, 1977. which was not part of the litigation before Judge Bullock (Exhibit 14, Addendum 5).

Corbett

and Gurr signed a release of that judgment on September 28,
982 (Exhibit No. 13, Addendum No. 6).
On September
Settlement Agreement

10. 1982. the parties entered

into a

(Exhibit No. 11, Addendum No. 11).

On

October 4. 1982, Corbett and Gurr made payment of $48,720.79
and received additional credits on the contract not involved
in the pending matter (Exhibits No. 21, 22, and 23, Addenda 8,
9, and 10).
On November 1, 1982, this Court, on motion of respondents for dismissal

of the appeals with prejudice, granted

dismissal of the appeals in both 18529 and 18594 (Exhibit No.
4, Addendum No. 11).
On November 1. 1982. Boyd Corbett, doing business as
Utah Ranchlands. filed and recorded a notice of interest (Exhibit No. 2, Addendum No. 12).
November 26, 1982. a further hearing was held before
Judge Bullock in the trial court (Exhibit No. 26, Addendum No.
13) .
On January

6,

1983, additional

-4-

hearings were held

before Judge Bullock (Exhibit No. 27, Addendum No. 14).
On April

19, 1983. Judge Bullock rendered and Order

and Judgment (Exhibit No. 5. Addendum No. 15).
On May 17. 1983. Corbett and Gurr filed a new appeal
in the matter pending before Judge Bullock (Exhibit 28. Addendum 16). from the April 19. 1983, order.
In the new appeal. Corbett and Gurr raised the issue
of whether or not Fitzgeralds had made an open court offer to
honor prior sales of Corbett and Gurr. which the Court specifically declined

in its order and

judgment of April 19. 1983

(Exhibit No. 5. Addendum No. 15).
On
additional
17).

April

18.

1984.

Corbett

filed

notice

of

interest

(Exhibit

On November

1.

198^

the

No.

Supreme

and

recorded

3. Addendum
Court

an
No.

rendered a

decision in that appeal (Record 59:63, Addendum 17).
On May 26. 1983, after the notice of appeal had been
filed

in the case pending

before Judge Bullock,

Fitzgeralds

brought suit to remove the notice of interest and for damages
for slander of title by the filing of the notice of interest
by Boyd

Corbett

and

Utah Ranchlands,

a partnership

of Boyd

Corbett and Keith Gurr.
The appeal from the judgment rendered in that case is
the matter now before this Court.
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POINT I
The Trial Court Erred in Holding the Settlement Agreement Was Enforceable Because the
Conditions of the Agreement Were Not Met.
After Corbett and Gurr had lost the case they brought
against

the

Fitzgeralds.

Civil

No.

Bullock, and after they had filed
ceeding

(Supreme

Court

Nos.

50.224.

tried

by

Judge

their appeals in that pro-

18529

and

18594).

counsel

for

Corbett and Gurr failed to file a brief on appeal, as required
by the Rules of the Supreme Court (Record. Supreme Court cases
18529 and 18594).
That

case

involved

a

Uniform

Real

Estate

Contract

dated May 13. 1977, an Earnest Money Agreement and Option to
Purchase dated February 1. 1977. and an Option dated September
7.

1977

also

had

(Exhibit No. 1. Addendum No. 4 ) .
a Uniform

Real

Estate

Contract

Corbett
dated

and Gurr

September

1.

1977. with Fitzgeralds which, at that time, was still in force
and

effect.

The

Sepember

1. 1977. Uniform Real Estate Con-

tract was not a part of Judge Bullock's decision and the Supreme

Court

cases

18529

and

18594

(Record:

313:1-6. testimony of Lee A. Fitzgerald:

312:24-25

Record:

and

281:7-13.

testimony of Boyd Corbett).

pending

On

September

in

the

10.

Supreme

1982. while

Court,

the

the

parties

agreement denominated as Settlement Agreement
Addendum

7).

That

Agreement

and

-6-

its

two

appeals

entered

were

into

an

(Exhibit No. 11.

enforceability

is

the

subject matter of this appeal.
A.

Failure to pay $49,000+ on September 10. 1982.
The

next

to

last

sentence

of

that

Settlement

Agreement provides:
This Agreement subject to payment in excess
of $49,000 on the DuPratt contract on this
10th day of September. 1982 (emphasis added).
As

stated

in Ephraim

Theatre

Company

v. Hawk.

321

P.2d 221. 7 Utah 2d 163 (1958):
...the fundamental concepts in regard to
contracts:
that their purpose is to reduce
to writing the conditions upon which the
minds of the parties have met and to fix
their rights and duties in respect thereto.
The intent so expressed is to be found, if
possible, within the four corners of the
instrument
itself
in accordance with the
ordinary
accepted
meaning
of
the
words
used...
Generally speaking, neither of the
parties, nor the court has any right to ignore or modify conditions which are clearly
expressed merely because it may subject one
of the parties to hardship, but they must be
enforced "in accordance with the intention as
*** manifested by the language used by the
parties to the contract.11
ID at 166.
That

statement

was

again

affirmed

by

the

Court

in

Jones v. Acme Building Products. Inc.. 450 P.2d 743. 22 Utah
2d 202 (1969). at page 206.
Whether
Agreement

the

above

quoted

portion

of

the

Settlement

is a condition of the contract is to be taken from

the fair reading of the Agreement.
P.2d 951 (1977). the Court said:

-7-

In Cheever v. Schramm. 577

The intention to create a condition in a
contract must appear expressly or by clear
implication.
Id. at 953.
That was reiterated in Creer v. Thurman. 581 P.2d 149
(1978). where the Court said:
Whether a provision in a contract is a condition, the nonfulfillment of which excuses
performance, depends upon the intent of th
prties. to be ascerained from a fair and
reasonable construction of the language used
in light of all the circumstances when they
executed the contract.
id. at 151.
It is also supported in Porter v. Groover. 734 P.2d
464 (1987). where the Court said:
Whether a promise is conditional depends upon
the parties* intent, which is derived from a
fair and reasonable construction of the language used in light of all the circumstances
when the parties executed the contract.
Id. at 465.
The Settlement

Agreement

(Exhibit No. 11. Addendum

No. 7). shows that after spelling out. in three paragraphs,
respective
the parties

responsibilities
said

under

"This Agreement

the

Settlement

is subject

Agreement,

to payment

in

excess of $49,000 on the DuPratt contract on this 10th day of
September.

1982.

Clearly,

upon

the

language

drawn

by the

signers of the agreement itself, the Settlement Agreement was
conditioned upon payment of the $49,000 on that specific date.
The circumstances under which that was included on

-8-

Exhibit 11, are as follows:

Q:
(to Leland Fitzgerald):
What was the
reason for including in Exhibit 11 the reference to the payment of the $49,000?
A:
I was in a real bad financial bind on
some property and I needed money real bad and
I told Mr. Corbett to try to resolve this and
he come out and this is what we resolved.
(Record 317:23-25, 318:1-3)
That the condition was not met

is borne out by the

testimony of all of the parties to this litigation.
bett admitted
1982.

as

Mr. Cor-

that the $49,000 was not paid on September 10,

required

283:19-25, 284:1-8).

by

the

Settlement

Agreement

Corbett further agreed that the Settle-

ment Agreement was subject to payment

on that date.

asked:
Q: And he entered into this Agreement and it
specifically provided that it was subject to
paying the excess of that payment in excess
of $49,000 on September 10, 1982?
A:

(Record

Yes.

(Record 284:22-25, 285:1).
Mr. Gurr stated:
Q: You know for a fact that you didn't pay
the $49,000 on the 10th of September, don't
you?
A:

No I don't.

Q:

You don't know that?

A:
I don't know that.
Whenever the check
was made out or whenever the cashier's check

-9-

He was

was made out. that's when it was paid and the
records will show that date, and I donft know
when it was.
Q: If it was paid on October 4. then that's
what the record will show.
A:

Sure.

(Record 314:3-13).
Exhibit

No.

21

shows

that

the

payment

of

the

$49,551.70 was credited by three credits given to Corbett and
Gurr and a payment of $48,720.79 on October 4. 1982.

Exhibit

No. 22 shows that that payment of $48,720.79 was then paid by
Mr. Fitzgerald on the indebtedness about which he testified on
the DuPratt contract on October 6. 1982.

Exhibit No. 23 shows

the record of payment and shows that the 1982 payment on that
contract was paid on October 4. 1982. 57 days late.
dence

was

offered

by

Corbett

and

Gurr

to

dispute

No evithat

the

payment was paid on October 4. 1982. and not on September 10.
1982 as required by Exhibit No. 11 (Addendum No. 7 ) .
In Bentley v. Potter. 694 P.2d 617 (1984). the Court
said:
Failure of consideration exists "wherever one
who has either given or promised to give some
performance fails without his fault to receive in some material respect the agreed
exchange for that performance."
Id. at 619.
That
again

position on failure of consideration

in Copper

State Leasing v. Blacker Appliance

ture. 90 U.A.R. 23. August 31. 1988. at page 25.

-10-

is quoted
& Furni-

Fitzgeralds were not at fault in the failure of Corbett and Gurr to make that $49,000 payment on September 10,
1982.

There is a failure of consideration for that Settlement

Agreement.

A condition to it was that the payment of the

$49,000 owed under the September 7. 1977. contract be paid on
that date, the 10th of September, 1982.

The testimony was

admitted by Corbett and Gurr that the payment was to be made
on that date, and that payment was not made on that date.
Thus there is a failure of consideration.
B.

Failure to Terminate Legal Proceedings.
The Settlement Agreement (Addendum No. 7) reads:

We G. Boyd Corbett and Keith L. Gurr, doing
business at Utah Ranchlands. hereby agree to
settle all legal actions, lawsuits, appeals
to the Supreme Court, etc., concerning Leland
A. and Helen S. Fitzgerald and all their
Cedar Valley property.
The

factual

circumstances

settle all of their lawsuits.

are

that

they

did

not

The dismissal of the pending

appeals was not occasioned by acts of Corbett and Gurr. but it
was dismissed on the respondents1 motion for dismissal of the
appeals, with prejudice, which was granted on November 1, 1982
(Exhibit No. 4, Addendum No. 11).

The Record of the Supreme

Court in cases 18529 and 18594 will show that in pursuance of
the Settlement Agreement, Corbett & Gurr did not initiate any
dismissal of their appeals.
In addition to failing to dismiss their appeals in
the underlying proceeding (Civil No. 50,224, District Court of
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Utah County) presided over by Judge J. Robert Bullock, upon
which judgment had been entered June 24. 1982 (Exhibit No. 1,
Addendum No. 4), Corbett and Gurr

continued

to pursue the

matter, as is demonstrated by Exhibit No. 26, a minute entry
of November 26, 1982 and the minute entry. Exhibit No. 27,
wherein the Court said:
The Court will also hear arguments, if any,
as to whether or not the Court should, on its
own initiative, amend the judgment with respect to the offer of defendants, Lee A.
Fitzgerald and Helen Fitzgerald, referred to
in the Court* s memorandum decision of May 4,
1982.
After hearing the matter. Judge Bullock entered an
Order and Judgment (Exhibit No. 5, Addendum No. 15), wherein
the Court said:
1. Plaintiffs [Corbett and Gurr] allege that
the Court erred in its judgment entered June
25, 1982, by failing to order defendant, Lee
Fitzgerald, to perform according to his offer
to honor contracts between plaintiffs and
innocent purchasers of property covered under
May 13, 1978 contracts.
Language in the memorandum decision entered
May 4, 1982, which apparently created the
ambiguity as to whether or not the Court
intended to so order, was included in the
decision to encourage the defendant to perform according to his unsolicited offer so as
to minimize litigation and avoid further loss
and damage to innocent purchasers. However,
defendant's offer had no bearing whatsoever
on the decision entered by the Court, the
decision was not conditioned thereon, and the
Court did not intend to assume responsibility
for supervising defendant's performance according to the offer. The Court, therefore
declines to alter its judgment on the basis
that the alleged omission constituted error,
oversight, or mistake.
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Thereafter, Corbett and Gurr filed an appeal of that
Order

and Judgment

pursued

then

(Exhibit No, 28. Addendum No. 16)-

the very

issues

that

they

now pursue

They

in this

proceeding, as is demonstrated by Exhibit No. 25, their brief
filed
the

on appeal.

issues

Corbett
issue

germane

and Gurr

of

Almost

the

to

two thirds of that brief

the

addressed,

so-called

original

judgment.

at page

agreement

Specifically.

21 of their

to honor

addressed

their

brief, the
prior

con-

tracts with third parties, which is carried forward on pages
22 and 23 of the brief.

Attached to it was the very Settle-

ment Agreement at issue in this proceeding.

That appeal cul-

minated in the decision of this Court, in Corbett v. Fitzgerald. 709 P.2d 384 (1985) (Addendum No. 18).
The trial court in this case should have ruled that
there was

a failure

of

consideration

when Corbett

and Gurr

breached conditions of the Settlement Agreement by failing to
settle their legal actions, lawsuits, and appeals but continued to pursue them thereafter.

As stated in VanDyke v. Moun-

tain Coin Mach. Distrib, Court of Appeals of Utah, August 3,
1988. 758 P.2d 962 (1988).
Thus, Mountain Coin proceeded with the lawsuit despite consummation of the parties1
agreement resolving the lawsuit.
Id. at 964.
The

Court

of Appeals

held

that

the trial

court

in

that proceeding did not err in directing a verdict that Moun-

-13-

tain Coin had breached the settlement agreement.
In the case now at bar. the trial court erred in not
ruling

that

Corbett

and „_ Gurr

had

breached

the

Settlement

Agreement by continuing their litigaton.
By the time of the final ruling in this matter, the
Supreme Court had ruled in 1985 in the former matter.
Court's ruling was submitted

The

as a supplement to the record

(Record, pages 59-63).
The trial court should have ruled that Corbett and
Gurr had breached the Settlement Agreement by continuing their
litigation, and that this barred any further rights to claim
benefits under the Settlement Agreement.
C.

Failure

to make

payment

on tender

of

$11,000

payment.
The defendants breached the Settlement Agreement
by failing to make payment or tender of payment of the $11,000
required by paragraph 3 of the Settlement Agreement (Addendum
No. 7). Mr. Gurr was asked about that payment.

The Agreement

called for $11,000 paid in three annual installments of $3,667
plus interest at seven percent, commencing February 1. 1983.
Mr. Gurr was asked:
Q: If I understand you correctly, with regard to the $11,000. you never took the
$3,667 to him plus the interest on those
payments as those payments became due.
A:

No. but we talked about it.

-14-

Q:
You never did tender the $11,000
handing him a check for the $11,000?

in by

A: No, because he never did proceed to honor
these contracts like he ajjreed to do.
(Record 313:7-11, 15-18)
In

answer

to

a

question

by

the

Court

about

the

$11,000. Mr. Corbett said:
Thank you, your Honor.
So basically the
answer to your question, the $11,000, we
never did offer payment.
I never did. Now
my partner Keith Gurr could have. I did not.
(Record, 265:15-18)
Mr. Fitzgerald

corroborated

their

testimony when he

was asked:
Q: My question was, did anyone ever tender
any payment of the $3,667 that was to paid on
February 1 of the following year?
A:

No.

Q:
Did
tract?
A:

they

ever

on the con-

No.

Q:
Did they ever
the agreement?
A:

pay anything

offer

to pay anything

on

No.

(Record 325:5-14)
Under the Settlement Agreement, Corbett and Gurr were
to

have

paid

$11,000

commencing

annual installments of $3,667.

February

1, 1983,

in three

For that, they were to receive

320 acres to be deeded to them as received by Fitzgerald from
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the persons from whom he was purchasing the same property.
Nowhere in the Record did Corbett and Gurr ever produce evidence that they had made an x>frfer to pay the sum owed
under the Settlement Agreement.

If they had made an offer in

writing of a particular sum, delivered to Fitzgerald, it would
be

equivalent

to

the

actual

production

or tender

of money.

But both have testified that they did not make any such tender
of payment.
pertaining

70A-2-511, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended,
to

tender

of

payment

under

the Commercial

Code,

provides, in part, that unless agreed otherwise, a tender of
payment

is

a condition

to

the

seller's

duty

to

tender

and

Inc. v. Holt,

538

complete any delivery.
As

stated

in

Zion's

Properties,

P.2d 1319 (1975),
A tender requires that there be a bona fide,
unconditional, offer of payment of the amount
of money due, coupled with an actual production of the money or its equivalent (emphasis
added).
The Court went on to say:
But there was no actual tender of the amounts
due under the contract within the foregoing
definition...
Unless there is some showing of legal excuse
or justification for failure to perform he
obligations of a contract, it must be enforced according to its terms.
Id. at 1322.
That

statement

has not

been

changed,

and was

firmed in LHIW. Ind., v. DeLorean, 753 P.2d 961 (1988).
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reaf-

D.

Consideration for the settlement agreement.
While

ment

required

constitute
was

to

it might
be made

consideration

already

obligated

be argued that the $49,000 pay-

on September

10, 1982, could

not

for the Settlement Agreement, as it

and

past

due

under

the

September

1,

1977, Uniform Real Estate Contract on which Corbett and Gurr
were delinquent with their payment, nevertheless

it could be

argued that their agreement to settle all legal actions, lawsuits and appeals concerning Leland and Helen Fitzgerald and
the payment of $11,000 in three annual installments of $3,667
commencing
the

February

Settlement

1, 1983, do constitute

Agreement

of

Leland

and

consideration for

Helen Fitzgerald

to

deed Corbett and Gurr the 320 acres and to honor Corbett and
Gurr's previous sales.

Nevertheless, the failure of consider-

ation in failing to pay the $49,000 when required by the condition of the Settlement Agreement on September 10, 1982, and
the failure to drop their legal proceedings and instead pursuing those trial court proceedings on November

26 and January

6. their Notice of Appeal, Exhibit No. 28. their brief filed
on appeal. Exhibit 29, and the ultimate decision of the Court,
Exhibit

5, rendered

on April

19, 1983, and

Corbett and Gurr v. Fitzgerald. 109 P.2d

the decision

in

384 (1985) together

with their failure to make the payments of $11,000 as required
by the Settlement Agreement, all demonstrate that there was a
failure

of

consideration

on

the
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part

of Corbett

and Gurr.

Thus,

the Settlement

Agreement

is not

enforceable,

and

this

Court should so rule.
As stated

in DeMentas v. Estate of Tallas, 764 P.2d

628 (1988),
In a contract action in this state, consideration or a legally sufficient substitute for
consideration must be established as part of
plaintiff1s prima facie case.
Id. at 632.
Corbett and Gurr did not establish their prima facie
case of the consideration having been met for the enforcement
of the Settlement Agreement.

The trial court erred in holding

that the Settlement Agreement was enforceable.
POINT II
The Trial Court Erred in Failing to Rule that
the Issue of Honoring Defendants1 Contracts
with Third Parties Was Res Judicata.
After the judgment in the original proceeding brought
by Corbett and Gurr against Lee and Helen Fitzgerald

(plain-

tiffs* Exhibit No. 1, Addendum No. 4 ) , and after the appeals
of

those matters were dismissed

(plaintiffs1

Exhibit

No. 4,

Addendum No. 11) on motion of the respondents, further hearings were held

(Exhibit No. 26).

Thereafter, the trial court

judge, J. Robert Bullock, entered an Order, specifically with
regard to the so-called oral agreement in open court to honor
contracts with third parties.
Paragraph 1 of that Order specifically rules that the
open court statement was not intended
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to be a binding agree-

ment to honor the contracts of Corbett and Gurr to third parties.

Nevertheless, plaintiffs submitted to the Court a par-

tial transcript of that open court statement as Exhibit 9.
Following

Judge

Bullocks

filed a Notice of Appeal

ruling.

Corbett

and

Gurr

(Exhibit 28, Addendum No. 16).

In

the pursuit of that appeal, they filed a brief on appeal which
is a part of this record as Exhibit No. 29.

Point 5 of that

brief asserts that the open court statement should be made a
part of the final judgment.

Attached to that brief was a copy

of the Settlement Agreement. Exhibit No. 11. the very agreement in issue by the counterclaim of Corbett and Gurr.
This Court has spoken on a number of occasions on the
doctrine of res judicata and its two branches of claim preclusion and

issue preclusion.

One of the more complete state-

ments is found in Searle Bros, v. Searle. 588 P.2d 689 (1978).
wherein the Court set forth the four elements of the collateral estoppel doctrine, which is now identified as issue preclusion.
That decision was reaffirmed
the plaintiff

in a decision involving

in this case, handed down in August. 1988. in

Trimble Real Estate v. Monte Vista Ranch. 758 P.2d 451 (1988).
wherein the Court of Appeals set forth the distinction between
claim

preclusion

and

issue

preclusion.

The

Court

therein

points out that the first branch of res judicata is known as
"claim preclusion."
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Under claim preclusion, the most recent decision this
writer

has found

is the case of Madsen v. Borthick. decided

December 12, 1988. 97 U.A.R. 13. wherein the Court said:
Claim preclusion bars a cause of action only
if the suit in which that cause of action is
being asserted and the prior suit satisfy
three requirements.
First, both cases must
involve the same parties or their privies.
Second. the claim that is alleged to be
barred must have been presented in the first
suit or must be one that could and should
have been raised in the first action. Third,
the first suit must have resulted in a final
judgment on the merits.
Id. at 14.
In this case, all four parties
Lee and Helen Fitzgerald) were

(Corbett and Gurr and

the same parties;

the claim

was alleged during that proceeding and should have been presented in that proceeding;
judgment

(Exhibit

No.

1,

and the issue resulted in a final
Addendum

No.

4).

Initially,

the

appeal in that case was dismissed on motion of the respondents
for failure of the plaintiffs to file a brief on appeal (Exhibit No. 4 in this proceeding).

After additional hearings, the

case was appealed again, and the final decision was rendered
in Corbett
directed

and Gurr v. Fitzgerald,

supra, wherein the Court

itself to the judgments rendered and which were the

subject

matters

18594.

Thus,

appeal

issues,

of

the

the Court

first

two

declined

inasmuch as

those

prejudice.
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appeals.

Nos.

18529

to consider

those

issues were

dismissed

and

original
with

Thus, under claim preclusion, the claims now asserted
concerning the open court offer are barred.
The second avenue for consideration is the second leg
of

the

doctrine

of

res

judicata,

being

what

was

formerly

called collateral estoppel and is now called issue preclusion.
The four elements of issue preclusion were set forth
in Searle Bros.. supra, but are further identified in Trimble,
supra,

involving,

coincidentally,

a second

trial

of a claim

brought against Lee Fitzgerald, the plaintiff in this proceeding.

In that case, the Court of Appeals identified the four

elements of issue preclusion and defined them specifically on
page

454.

They

were

reiterated

by

this

Court

in Noble

v.

Noble, 761 P.2d 1369 (1988), and in Madsen, supra.
Applying

the

doctrine

of

issue

preclusion

to

the

facts of this case, the brief of appellants Corbett and Gurr
in the appeal

of

the case, tried

by Judge Bullock,

Supreme

Court No. 19225, the Court specifically found that the assignments

of

error

in

plaintiffs'

errors of the trial court

in not

brief,

namely,

including

the

claimed

the alleged open

court agreement of Lee and Helen Fitzgerald to honor the contracts of Corbett and Gurr with third parties (pages 21-23 of
their brief) are barred.

The Court said:

The assignments of error in plaintiffs1 brief
are directed toward the original judgments,
the same
judgments from which plaintiffs
appealed in Corbett v. Fitzgerald, numbers
18529 and 18594. supra. This Court declines
now to consider those original appeal issues.
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inasmuch as those issues and their appeals
were dismissed with prejudice. The order to
show cause hearings held subsequent to plaintiffs' original appeals to this Court do not
provide an occasion for plaintiffs to now
appeal the results of those hearings and
include in the instant appeal those issues
that were raised and dismissed in the original appeals.
The express ruling by this
Court on all issues raised by the prior
appeals is binding upon the parties. the
trial court and this court.
C & J Industries. Inc. v. Bailey. 669 P.2d 855. 856
(1983).
Plaintiffs1 claims of error as to
the original judgments were dismissed by this
Court with prejudice. That dismissal constitutes an affirmance of the original judgments, and they are not subject to further
attack in a subsequent appeal.... Plaintiffs
accepted the sum of $4,709.96 from defendants
I [Leland Fitzgerald and Helen Fitzgerald]
and released their judgment against them.
That judgment is therefore not reviewable on
appeal. (emphasis added)
Id. at 386.
In the proceeding

now before the Court

14. Addendum No. 5) shows that on September

(Exhibit No.

9. 1982. the day

before the so-called Settlement Agreement was executed. Leland
Fitzgerald gave a receipt and credit of $4,709.96 against the
September

1. 1977. contract

balance of $49,551.70.
credited

on Exhibit

No.

payment of $54,261.03. leaving a

The $49,551.70 is shown to have been
21 as

payment

on

the

September

1.

1977. contract.
That was a satisfied
on

appeal.

claim that

Corbett

and

judgment and is not

Gurr

attempt

reviewable

in this proceeding

to

the open court offer. Exhibit No. 9 in this pro-

ceeding, is somehow tied to this proceeding as a clarification
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of

tfie Settlement

Corbett

and

Gurr

Agreement,
are

Exhibit

attempting

to

No,
secure

11.
the

By so doing,
inclusion of

that prior issue despite the Court's ruling that the issue was
not reviewable on appeal.
This Court

should

not

countenance

such a back door

approach to inclusion of an issue already ruled upon by this
Court as being nonreviewable.

The Court should hold that the

claim that the Fitzgeralds should honor the contracts of Corbett and Gurr with third parties is barred by the doctrine of
res judicata.
POINT III
The Doctrines of Interpretation of Contracts
as Applied to the Evidence Presented Preclude
the Trial Court's Ruling that the Settlement
Agreement Was Enforceable.
On

the

issue

of

the

interpretation

three decisions of note should be considered.
Corporation v. Nielson Scott Co., 603 P.2d

803

of

contracts,

In Provo City
(1979), this

Court said:
In interpreting the contract in question,
this Court deals with a question of law. As
such, the same deference need not be accorded
the lower court's position as we would accord
findings of fact.
Id. at 805.
In Walter E. Heller v. U.S. Rock Wool Co., 762 P.2d
1104 (1988), the Court of Appeals of Utah said:
Questions
of
contract
intepretation.
such as this, are questions of law to
which we owe no deference but review for
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correctness. Ted R. Brown and Assocs.
v. Carnes Corp,, 753 P.2d 964 (1988).
id. at 1105.
And in Power Sys. & Controls v. Keith's Elec, 765
P.2d 5 (1988). the Court of Appeals of Utah said:
It is well-settled that if a trial court
interprets a contract as a matter of law, the
trial court's interpretation is afforded no
particular deference on appeal... However,
when a contract is ambiguous because of uncertainty or incompleteness concerning the
parties' rights and duties under the contract, extrinsic evidence is permissible to
ascertain the parties' intent.
Id. at 9-10.
The primary issue in this appeal is that the trial
court ordered the plaintiffs to deliver deeds to "honor" contracts entered into between the defendants, Corbett and Gurr,
and third parties.
During closing argument of the trial of the former
proceeding, counsel for the Fitzgeralds, prior to May 4, 1982,
made an offer to the court to honor legitimate contracts Corbett and Gurr had entered into with third parties.

That is

referred to on page 12 of the Memorandum Decision of Judge
Bullock dated May 4, 1982 (Exhibit No. 10, Addendum No. 3).
Plaintiffs attempted during the trial of the matter
now at bar to use that open court statement as a basis for
interpretation of the meaning of the phrase in the Settlement
Agreement (Exhibit No. 11, Addendum No. 7) that said "Fitzgeralds agree to honor all Corbett and Gurr's previous sales."
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Even though the open court statement was made more than four
months

prior

to

the

Settlement

Agreement.

In applying

the

rules of interpretation, this Court has stated:
The test to be applied is, would the meaning
be plain to a person of ordinary intelligence
and understanding viewing the matter fairly
and reasonably in accordance with the usual
and natural meaning of the words and in light
of the existing circumstances.
Auto Lease Company v. Central Mutual Insurance Co., 7 Utah 2d
336, 325 P.2d 264 (1958).
At no place in the pleadings or in the evidence did
counsel for Corbett and Gurr, or they themselves, assert that
the wording of the Settlement Agreement was ambiguous.

While

it is well settled that if a contract is ambiguous, extrinsic
evidence as to the parties1

intent must be received and con-

sidered in an effort to glean what the parties actually agreed
to,

this

requires

factual findings.

the

taking

of evidence

and

the making of

Hornsby v. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop,

Court of Appeals of the State of Utah, July 8, 1988, 758 P.2d
723.
As stated

in LPS Hospital v. Capitol Life Insurance

Co., October, 1988, 94 U.A.R. 16:
A cardinal rule in construing the contract is
to give effect to the intentions of the parties
and,
if
possible,
these
intentions
should be gleaned from an examination of the
text of the contract itself.
In testimony, Boyd Corbett stated that when the Settlement Agreement was prepared and signed, Keith Gurr was not
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present

(Record 280:17-24).

Corbett

was

any

Nowhere in the testimony of Boyd

explanation

parties of the expression

given

as

to

the

intent

of

the

in the Settlement Agreement "Fitz-

geralds agree to honor all Corbett and Gurr's previous sales."
Apparently,

Corbett

and

Gurr's

counsel

intended

to

show that the prior open court statement explained the intent
of the parties some four months later and it was so indicated
in the Findings of Fact.

The Court made a Finding No. 20 that

the quotation in open court in the earlier proceeding before
Judge Bullock is a basis for the background of an interpretation of the Exhibit 11.

However, that cannot be the basis of

it. first, because it was not contemporaneous with the preparation

of the Settlement Agreement.

Court

ruling

that

addressed

that

Furthermore,

issue

the Supreme

in the second

appeal

and in the ruling of April 19. 1983. by Judge Bullock (Exhibit
No. 5) cannot be the basis for the intention of the parties on
September 10. 1982.
The Settlement Agreement
with numerous

other

matters.

The

itself

intention

statement

pertaining

to

the

honoring

sales

the

of

the

Settlement

at

bottom

shows that

of

of

the

Corbett
Agreement

it deals
one-line

and

Gurr's

cannot

be

inferred from the conduct and behavior presented to the Court
prior to a judgment four months earlier.
After

the

judgment

had

been

entered

wherein

Judge

Bullock had not ordered Fitzgeralds to honor those contracts.
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for counsel to say in the Settlement Agreement that that was
the intent of the parties is not borne out by the record.
Furthermore,

the

Record

at

253:10-20

shows that counsel for Corbett and Gurr

and

254:1-25

says that the tran-

script was offered not to explain the intent of the parties in
the Settlement Agreement, but to demonstrate that a notice of
interest

filed

by Corbett

and Gurr predicated

the filing of

the action at bar is in fact a lis pendens.
The

trial

court

in this matter

indicated

at Record

256:1-18 that Exhibit No 9. the transcript of the open court
offer from the prior trial was received to show the intent of
the notice of interest.

No testimony was given as to what was

meant by the words "honor the previous sales."

The words as

stated from the four corners of the Agreement, and which were
not

explained

by

the

testimony

of

the

parties

except

this

reference to the prior open court offer in the earlier trial.
The evidence before the trial court does not meet the requirements of this Court's decisions holding that where there is an
ambiguity, the Court must first find that there is an ambiguity and must take evidence on that ambiguity.
Nowhere in the Amended Findings of Fact filed by the
trial

court

in this matter

does

the Court

make any

finding

that this contract is ambiguous, nor does it make any finding
except Findings 19 and 20 pertaining to the prior open court
statement as a basis to determine the intent of the parties.
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In
1988.

Cottonwood

Mall

Co.

v.

Sine,

decided

November,

95 U.A.R.-ll. page 13. this Court adopted the majority

rule from Valcarce v. Bitters. 12 Utah 2d 61. 362 P.2d 427.
428 (1961):
[A] condition precedent to the enforcement of
any contract is that there must be a meeting
of the minds of the parties, which must be
spelled out. either expressly or impliedly,
with sufficient definiteness to be enforced.
The problem with the statement in the Settlement Agreement is
that

it does not

indicate

that

if Fitzgeralds

are

to honor

Corbett and Gurr's previous sales, what sales are referred to.
nor whether or not by "honoring" they mean that if the consideration paid to Corbett and Gurr on those contracts is turned
to Fitzgeralds, then Fitzgeralds would carry out the balance
of the terms of the contracts.
As it was presented to the Court by reference to the
prior open court

statement. Corbett

and Gurr are in the in-

equitable position of asking the Court to order Fitzgeralds to
deliver deeds to Corbett and Gurr's buyers, with Corbett and
Gurr retaining all of the consideration previously received on
those contracts.
The record is deficient

in showing the intentions of

the parties at the time of signing the Settlement Agreement.
As stated in Buehner Block Co. v UWC Associates. 752 P.2d 892
(1988).
there are no findings of fact respecting the
intentions of the parties based upon extrinsic evidence.
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id. at 895.
In the

case

at

bar

there

is no extrinsic

evidence

other than the inadmissible and improperly received Exhibit 9
transcript from the prior trial from which the intentions of
the parties could

be determined

Corbett and Gurr's previous
stated

as to the meaning of "honor

sales."

in Buehner. supra, the Court cannot divine the intent

of the parties, and the unexplained
unenforceable.
recent

Absent such finding, as

decision

This
of

position
the

Utah

is
Court

intent makes the contract
further
of

supported

Appeals.

by

Crowther

the
v.

Carter. January 4. 1989. 99 U.A.R. 29. wherein the Court said:
But it is not the function of a court to
rewrite an unambiguous contract. Provo City
Corp. v. Nielson Scott Co.. 603 P.2d 803
(Utah 1979).
Id. at 30.
In this case, the Court ruled on a matter without findings and
took an issue in the Settlement Agreement without making findings as to the intent of the parties and without hearing extrinsic evidence, with the exception of a statement made four
months

earlier

in closing

ruling

by Judge Bullock

argument

by

in the earlier

counsel

prior

decision.

to the

The court

then wrote a condition into the Settlement Agreement and ordered the issuance of deeds on highly questionable contracts,
as is more fully explained in the remainder of this brief.
The Court should rule that it was error to hold that
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the

language

in

the

open

court

offer

prior

to

judgment

to

define the intent of the parties four months later in a Settlement
matter

Agreement
was

after

pending

on

judgment

had

been

entered

appeal.

Accordingly.

and

the

the

contract

should be held unenforceable.
POINT IV
The Trial Court Erred in Ordering Fitzgeralds
to Deliver Deeds to James F. Pratt, Vern H.
Bo 1 lander. Dale E. Beus. Lynn N. and Myna S.
Murdock. James B. and Judy R. Alvey. and
Corbett and Gurr.
In this

case, the trial

court,

in interpreting

the

contract to reguire Fitzgeralds to honor the sales of Corbett
and Gurr. ordered

the Fitzgeralds to convey deeds to persons

designated by Corbett and Gurr in their testimony.

The Court

further ordered Fitzgeralds to grant a specific performance of
the Settlement Agreement and ordered Fitzgeralds to convey to
Corbett and Gurr 320 acres of property on payment of $11,000.
In Barker v. Francis. 741 P.2d 548 (1987). the Court
of Appeals acknowledged that
It is not necessary, however, that the contract itself contain all the particulars of
the agreement.
The crucial factor is that
the parties agreed on the essential elements
of the contract.
Id. at 551.
In
essential

this

case,

elements

of

there

was

no

testimony

of

what

the contract were, particularly

as it

pertains to "honoring the Corbett and Gurr previous sales."
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the

In the Barker case, supra, the Court held that it was
improper for the trial court to interpret contracts to require
a payment

of a one-half

interest

in the ranch that was the

subject of the litigation, because the parties were unable to
deliver title to one-half of the ranch properties since their
wives had not joined in the Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to
Purchase.

The Court

quoted

from Herrin v. Herrin. 595 P.2d

1152. 1155 (Mont. 1979):
While a court may interpret contracts which
are open to interpretation, a court may not
make a new one for the parties and may not
alter or amend one which the parties themselves have made.
The Court then also cited Provo City Corp. v. Nielson
Scott

Co.. 603 P.2d

803. 806

(1979) on the rewriting

of an

ambiguous contract.
In the case at bar. the contract was clearly ambiguous as to what it meant in the contract to "honor all Corbett
and Gurr's previous sales."
order

specific

The Court nevertheless went on to

performance.

The

order

to

convey

title

is

deficient in several respects:
A.

There was no evidence that Fitzgeralds had title

to the properties which were the subject matter of the sales
of Corbett and Gurr. and could convey title as ordered by the
Court.
B.

There was an ambiguity and no explanation given

as to who was to get the funds already paid
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to Corbett and

Gurr on their previous sales, as they had done in prior contracts, as testified to by Lee Fitzgerald.
C.

There was no testimony on what sales the parties

were contemplating when they signed the Settlement Agreement.
D.

What

does

"honor

Corbett

and

Gurr's

previous

sales" mean?
In order to enter the judgment the trial court had to
rewrite terms into that Settlement Agreement that were neither
set forth in the Agreement itself not testified to by any of
the parties to the action.
In
Leland

the

Settlement

and Helen Fitzgerald

Agreement,
agreed

it was

provided

that

to give by warranty deed

320 acres, and that warranty deeds would be given "at the time
it

is

released

to

Leland

and

Helen

Fitzgerald

schedule with Helen Stassi and John L. Yurka."

as
The

per

the

judgment

entered and signed by the Court provided that upon payment of
$11,000, the plaintiffs were ordered

to convey the 320 acres

without including the provision that "the warranty deed is to
be given at the time the property is released to Leland A. and
Helen Fitzgerald" in accordance to their schedule.
In addition,

the Settlement

Agreement

provided

that

Corbett and Gurr were to pay $11,000 in three annual installments of $3,667 plus interest at 7% on the principal balance
beginning February 1. 1983.

The judgment of the Court ordered

Fitzgeralds to convey the title to the property upon the pay-
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ment of $11,000 with no provision for the interest provided in
the

Settlement

Agreement,

thus

rewriting

the

terms

of

the

Settlement Agreement.
The testimony of James Pratt is that he traded Corbett and Gurr a bag of diamonds, with an appraised value of
$60,000 but that with Corbett and Gurr he agreed to show them
as a payment

on a contract

of $22,000,

Pratt, Record 301:11-25, 305:1-6).
its 16 and
Gurr

and

16a provided

Fitzgeralds

if the

goes

(Testimony of James

The sales contract. Exhiblawsuit

against

the

between Corbett
sellers,

the

would return the cash of $22,000 (Record 305:1-18).
tract with James Pratt was a conditional contract

and

seller

The conpertaining

to the initial lawsuit brought by Corbett and Gurr against the
Fitzgeralds, which provided as a condition that if the lawsuit
went against Corbett and Gurr, they would return his $22,000.
In fact, the lawsuit did go against Corbett and Gurr, and on
appeal
first

it was
appeal

affirmed,
and

the

both on the first
second

appeal.

dismissal

Under

those

of

the

circum-

stances, the obligation of Corbett and Gurr was to return the
cash of James F. Pratt.

Nevertheless, the court ordered the

Fitzgeralds to convey title to land covered by the contract.
Under those circumstances specific performance was erroneously
ordered by the court.
Mr.
matter, and

Bolinder

was

not

called

at

the

trial

the exhibits pertaining to the Bolinder
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in

this

contract

were presented to the court under
bett.

the testimony of Boyd Cor-

Exhibit No. 17 shows that a credit was given to Utah

Ranchlands for $15,000 for drilling credit as set forth in the
contract and that the balance of $63,000 had been paid down to
a balance of $43,000 by the time of trial.

No order was made

that the remaining $43,000 should be paid over to the Fitzgeralds, who were
order

entered

credit

or

expected
pertaining

the

to honor

the contract,

nor was

to the $15,000 drilling

downpayment.

Under

those

any

certificate

circumstances,

the

trial court was in error in ordering a conveyance of title to
Bolinder.

No

evidence

was

presented

that

Fitzgeralds

had

title to the property that was to be conveyed to Bollanders.
Corbett
ment

with

and Gurr presented

Dale Beus

a

ledger

showed a balance of $44,850.

as evidence of an agree-

sheet. Exhibit

No.

18, which

However, counsel for Corbett and

Gurr acknowledged that the Exhibit 18 he submitted as evidence
of the Dale Beus contract is not a contract at all, and that
it pertains to property in Box Elder County and not any property which is the subject of the Settlement Agreement between
the parties (Record 378:6-25).
When Leland Fitzgerald was called to testify regarding the Beus contract, he produced Exhibit No. 24, which counsel for Corbett and Gurr later acknowledged was the only contract between Corbett and Gurr and Beus.
produced

when Mr. Fitzgerald

asked
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Exhibit No. 24 was

Mr. Beus

to produce

his

contract.

He came to Mr. Fitzgerald's home and produced Ex-

hibit No. 24. which is a contract signed by Boyd Corbett only
and does not bear the signature of Dale Beus.
testimony is that Mr. Fitzgerald

The unrebutted

confronted Mr. Beus and Mr.

Corbett and said he could not understand why they would bring
him a contract to sell 80 acres of land for $10. of which $1
had been paid, with $9 yet to be paid.

Mr. Beus said that Mr.

Corbett said that if he gave Fitzgerald

that contract. Fitz-

gerald would

321:16-24. 322:1-2).

Mr.

give him

Fitzgerald

so-called

went

80 acres

on

to

(Record

inquire

of Mr. Beus

about

this

contract and asked Mr. Beus if it was a bona fide

contract, why didn't

he sign

it?

Mr. Beus said he did not

want to get into any legal trouble and did not want to jeopardize himself and he would not sign it (Record 322:20-23).
Clearly

the

evidence

the examination
contract

presented

to

thecourt. unrebutted.

of Exhibit No. 24. shows

between Corbett

and Gurr

that

and

there was no

and Beus. and the Court's

order ordering the conveyance of title to Mr. Beus of that 80
acres described in that contract is error.
With regard to the Murdock contract, the testimony of
the Murdocks was. "I am not sure we had a contract as such,
but Boyd owed us some money and we'd invested in another Hideaway Ranch and he had turned

it over to the Draper Bank and

we'd paid the Bank the installments and finished paying it off
through the bank, and we have the cancelled
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checks and bank

deposit

books

295:9-15).

showing

that

we

was

paid

in

full"

(Record

This referred to the Hideaway Ranch in Juab Coun-

ty, not a contract pertaining to the Settlement Agreement as
alleged.

Mrs. Murdock was asked

for property
(Record

if they ever had a contract

in Cedar Valley, to which she said she did not

296:19-21).

Mr.

Murdock

was

asked

by

counsel

for

Corbett and Gurr whether or not he had a contract for purchase
of property (Record 298:5-7):
Q: Did you have a written contract for purchase of that property?
A:

We never did have a contract.

Thus, by the Settlement Agreement they were attempting to enforce the honoring of a contract that by the testimony of the buyers was not a written contract.
When the court a year later allowed Corbett and Gurr
to

reopen

the

case

in a hearing

on November

6,

1986, Mrs.

Murdock was called and identified a contract (Exhibit No. 30)
which they then said was a written contract.
Corbett and Gurr $25,000
been

paying

$40,000

on

They had loaned

(Record 416:7-10) and that they had
a Juab

County

property,

the

Hidden

Valley Ranch property earlier testified to (Record 416:14-16).
Then in order to produce a contract, they produced Exhibit 30
and claimed it to be the contract that should be honored.
With regard to James D. Alvey, Corbett and Gurr produced Exhibit No. 15. a Uniform Real Estate Contract dated 14
September

1977 and a record of payments.

-36-

That record of pay-

ments

shows

September

that

payments

had

been

received

from and

after

10. 1982. the date of the Settlement Agreement, and

counsel for Corbett and Gurr admitted that those payments had
been received for those several years by Mr. Gurr.
No

explanation was made for the reason that

if the

Settlement Agreement was really a valid and enforceable agreement, why the payments received after September 10. 1982 were
not turned over to the Fitzgeralds
by Mr. Gurr

(Record

instead of being pocketed

377:17-22 and 427:25 and 428:1-4).

The

Court inguired whether the money had been going to Mr. Fitzgerald,

but Mr. Brown

informed

the Court

they had

not. but

they were prepared to pay that money to Mr. Fitzgerald so that
he would not be "out."

The Court asked if it was being held

by the bank, and Mr. Brown stated that the bank was collecting
it and they had been giving credit to Mr. Gurr on other indebtedness (Record 428:9-15).
In

order

for

the

trial

court

to

have

entered

the

order ordering the Fitzgeralds to convey deeds to these buyers, the court had to write into the contract the definition
of what
1982.

sales were

to

deliverd;

include

intended

the

five

by the parties on September 10.
buyers

to whom

deeds were

to be

the court had to conclude that all of the contracts

were enforceable contracts, despite the foregoing explanations
of

the

write

inadequacy

of

the

contracts:

and

the

court

had

to

into the Settlement Agreement a provision that Corbett
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and Gurr were to retain all of the payments they had received,
except those received

after 1982 on the Alvey contract;

and

that Fitzgeralds should convey by deeds to the various parties
without

any other

evidence being presented

as to whether or

not title of the specific property involved was held by Fitzgeralds.

The order of conveyances in the judgment is in error

and should be reversed by this Court.
POINT V
The Trial Court Erred in Failing to Award
Damages and Attorneys Fees to Fitzgeralds for
Expenses Incurred as a Result of the Filing
of the Faulted Notice of Interest by Corbett
and Gurr.
After

Judge

Bullock

had

entered

judgment

June

25,

1982, in the original proceeding brought by Corbett and Gurr
against

Fitzgeralds

(Addendum

4 ) . Utah

Ranchlands

filed

a

Notice of Interest and recorded it on November 1, 1982 (Exhibit No. 2, Addendum No. 12).
filed

a Notice of

Interest

On April 18, 1984. Boyd Corbett
(Exhibit No. 3, Addendum No. 17)

(Testimony of Boyd Corbett, Record 226:23-25, 227:1-23).
The property described
part

of

the properties

in the notice of interest was

included

in Judge Bullock's

(Exhibit No. 1, Addendum No. 4 ) .

Testimony

of Boyd

judgment
Corbett

was that at the time of filing of the notice of interest he
knew that
judgment
had

no

they were
declaring

included within the descriptions

that Corbett

interest

in

those

of the

and Gurr and Utah Ranchlands
described

227:24-25, 228:1-3).
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proerties

(Record

Thereafter.

Corbett

and

Gurr's

counsel

introduced

Exhibit No. 9. which is the partial transcript pertaining to
the open court offer of the Fitzgeralds, in order to show that
the notice of interest was intended to be a lis pendens (Record 253:4-20).
The first notice of interest was recorded on November
1, 1982, the same date that the Supreme Court dismissed the
appeals of Corbett and Gurr in Supreme Court 18529 and 18594
(Exhibit No. 4. Addendum 11).
Neither
subsequent

in

filing

appeals, did

their

initial

appeals

or

in the

Corbett and Gurr ever file a motion

for stay of execution pending appeal and or supersedeas bond.
Under numerous established decisions of this court, the judgment of Judge Bullock from the time of its entry and recording
(Exhibit
30,

1, Addendum

1982, was

4) which

a valid

and

judgment was recorded

enforceable

on June

judgment which under

paragraph five ruled that Corbett and Gurr had no interest in
the properties

described

in Exhibit A attached

ment.

admits

included

Corbett

it

to the judg-

the properties which were

the subject matters of the notice of interest.
At that point, on November

1, 1982, the parties had

no pending litigation.
Pursuant

to

the

provisions

of

78-40-2,

Utah

Code

Annotated, 1953 as amended, a lis pendens may be filed "in any
action affecting

the title to or the right of possession of
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real property."

Plaintiff, at the time of the filing of the

complaint or thereafter, may file a notice of the pendency of
action.

The notice of interest is not a notice of a pendency

of action;

there was no pending action;

it was a final judg-

ment which became ultimately final on November 1. 1982. prior
to the filing of the notices of interest.

At that time, Cor-

bett and Gurr had no interest in the properties.
This action was commenced originally as an action for
slander of title and
sioned

by

the

to remove the cloud on the title occa-

notice

evidence Exhibits

of

interest.

Plaintiffs

put

into

6. 7 and 8. coupled with the testimony of

Lee Fitzgerald as to damages he suffered as a result of being
drawn into litigation by T.H. Bell, in part due to the filings
of the notice of interest.

The fact that that lawsuit was in

part caused by the notice of interest is demonstrated by Exhibit

8. letters

dated

February

from T.H. Bell, and particularly
12,

1983

and

February

13. 1984.

the

letters

typewritten

letters which are a part of Exhibit A in which T.H. Bell asserts the fact that Corbett and Gurr had filed notices clouding the title and impairing his sales.

T.H. Bell had a con-

tract that originally had been entered

into with Corbett and

Gurr.

When Corbett and Gurr defaulted, it was then rewritten

as a contract between Fitzgeralds and T.H. Bell
7).

In addition

to that. Fitzgeralds

put

(Exhibit No.

into evidence the

attorneys fees occasioned by the litigation (Exhibit No. 25).
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In the recent decision of Bass v. Planned Management
Services, 761 P.2d

566

(1988). this Court addressed

the ele-

ments of a slander of title action, which requires a slanderous written or oral statement.

The Court said

A slanderous statement is one that is derogatory or injurious to the legal validity of an
owner's title or to his or her right to sell
or hypothecate the property.
Id. at 568.
The
exhibits

testimony

(Record

of

Lee

Fitzgerald,

coupled

233:4-25

and

234:1-9) demonstrate

with

the

the

re-

quired proof of special damages.
The second element stated in Bass, supra, is that the
statement must be false.

At the time of the recording of the

notice of interest. Judge Bullock had ruled that Corbett and
Gurr and Utah Ranchlands had no interest in those properties;
therefore,

the

two

notices

of

interest

filed

constituted

a

false statement.
The statement must also have been made with malice,
and this court declined at that time to rule on the definition
of malice, but the testimony of Boyd Corbett referred to above
was to the effect that he knew that the court had ruled that
he

had

no

interest

both notices

of

in the

interest.

property;

neverthless, he filed

Fitzgeralds

knowledgeability of the lack of interest

now assert

that

that

in the property and

the filing of the notices constitute a legal malice, meeting
the third requirement for a slander of title.
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Fourth,

specific

damages must

be proven.

The exhi-

bits cited above demonstrate that Mr. Fitzgerald incurred over
$8,000

in legal

expenses, plus attorneys fees, to bring the

action to clear the title.
error

for the trial court

Under those circumstances, it was
to decline to award damages, even

though the court ordered the removal of the notices of interest as not being valid claims against the property and not a
lis pendens under 78-40-2.
The court went on to say that:
Slander of title actions are based only on
palpable economic injury and reguire a plaintiff
to prove special damages... Special
damages are ordinarily proved in a slander of
title action by evidence of a lost sale or
the loss of some other pecuniary advantage.
Absent a specific monetary loss flowing from
a slander affecting the saleability or use of
the property, there is no damage.
Id.- at 568.
In this case, the unrebutted

testimony and

evidence

submitted by Fitzgeralds shows that they incurred legal expenses to defend
and

also

the

the action brought against
attorneys

clear the title.

fees

involved

them by T.H. Bell,

in this proceeding

to

All of that meets the requirements set forth

in Bass, supra.
This Court should rule that it was error

to decline

to award Fitzgeralds damages for the slander of title.
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CONCLUSION
This Court should rule that the so-called Settlement
Agreement is unenforceable because Corbett and Gurr failed to
meet the conditions precedent of payment of $49,000 on September 10. 1982.

This Court should further rule that the Settle-

ment Agreement is unenforceable because of the breach of contract of Corbett and Gurr in failing to drop the actions they
had

commenced

make payment

against

the Fitzgeralds. and

their

failure to

of the $11,000 in accordance with the terms of

the Settlement Agreement.
This
honoring
barred

Court

Corbett

by

the

should

and

prior

further

Gurr's prior
rulings

of

rule
sales

that

the

is res

the Utah

issue

of

judicata and

Supreme

Court

and

Judge Bullock's rulings.
The Court should further rule that the Agreement was
vague and ambiguous, and that the trial court failed to take
evidence to establish the intent of the parties at the time as
regards the issue of honoring of prior sales, and that without
such findings the Agreement cannot be implemented.
The

Court

should

trial court ordering

also

rule

that

the delivery of deeds

the

Order

of

the

is in error, and

reverse the decision of the trial court.
The Court

should

reverse the trial court's

decision

on the slander of title issue, and should the trial court to
enter judgment in accordance with testimony now before it. or
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to take further testimony on the issue of damages suffered by
the Fitzgeralds as a result of the improperly filed notice of
interest.
This

Court

should

reverse

the

disposition

of

the

trial court.
Respectfully

submitted

this

22nd

1989.

^

^

s

M. Dayle Je
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day

of

February,

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY AND OF MAILING
I hereby certify, that eleven copies of the foregoing
was delivered to the Clerk of the Court. Utah Supreme Court.
and that four copies were mailed to the below named parties by
placing same in the United States mails, postage prepaid, this
22nd day of February. 1989. addressed as follows:
James R. Brown
Jardine. Linebaugh. Brown & Dunn
370 East South Temple. #400
Salt Lake City. UT 84111

M. Dayle Ja
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ADDENDUM NO.

1

JAMES R. BROWN (#4 56)
JARD1NE, LINEBAUGH, BROWN & DUNN
Attorneys for Defendant Keith Gurr
370 East South Temple, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7700
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
LEE A, FITZGERALD and
HELEN FITZGERALD, his wife,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

)
)
)
)

JUDGMENT

)

BOYD CORBETT and KEITH GURR,
and UTAH RANCHLANDS,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)

The above-entitled

matter

Civil No. 63914
Judge George E. Ballif

came before

the Honorable

George E. Ballif, Judge, for trial on the 24th day of October,
1985

and

continued

from

time-to-time

until

the

6th

day

of

November, 1986, when the matter was finally concluded by way of
testimony

and

final

Findings

of

Fact

apprised

in

the

argument.

and

The

Conclusions

premises

and

Court

of

for

having

Law
good

and
cause

made

being

its

fully

appearing,

therefor, it is hereby,

ORDERED,
entitled

ADJUDGED

AND

DECREED

that

Plaintiffs

are

to have the two notices of interest which appear of

record in the Utah County Recorder's Office to be removed.
is further,

IL

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiffs are not
entitled
shown.

to any recoverable damages as the same has not been
It is further,

ORDERED,
entitled

ADJUDGED

AND

DECREED

that

Defendants

to specific performance of the Settlement

dated September

are

Agreement

10, 1982 and that upon payment of the sum of

$11,000, Plaintiffs are hereby ordered and directed to convey
to

the

Defendants

320

acres

of

real

property,

more

fully

described as follows:
The Southwest Quarter of the Southeast
Quarter and the West half less the Southwest
Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section
3, Township 8 South, Range 2 West, Salt Lake
Base and Meridian.
It is further,

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiffs and each
of

them

are

to

convey

to

the

persons

and

the property

as

provided below:
a.

To James F. Pratt, the Southwest Quarter of

the Southwest Quarter of Section 36, Township 7 South,
Range 2 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.
b.

To Vern H. Bolinder, the South one-half of the

Southeast

Quarter

of

the Northeast

Quarter

and

the

West one-half of the Northeast Quarter of Section 10,
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Township

8 South, Range 2 West, Salt Lake Base and

Meridian,

and

the

Southwest

Quarter

and

North

one-half

of the Northwest Quarter

Quarter

of

Township

8 South, Range 2 West, Salt Lake Base and

the

Meridian, and

Northwest

and

the

Quarter

the Southeast

of

Parcel No. 33, Section

Section

3,

5, Township 8

South, Range 2 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.
c.

To

Southwest

Dale

E.

Quarter

Beus,

of

the

Section

North

half

30, Township

of

the

7 South,

Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.
d.

To Lynn N. Murdock and Mina S. Murdock, his

wife, Lots 1 and 2 of the West half of the Northwest
Quarter of Section 30 and commencing at the center of
Section
rods,

30, thence

thence West

East

80

160 rods,

rods,

thence

thence South

North

100

100 rods,

thence East 180 rods, to the point of beginning, all
in Section 30, Township 7 South, Range 1 West, Salt
Lake Base and Meridian.
It is further,

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Defendants cause to
be paid to the Plaintiffs the sum of $17,279.91 together with
interest

at

the rate of

8.75%

from

and

after

September

10,

1982, and upon receipt of said payment, Plaintiffs are to deed
to James D. Alvey and Judy R. Alvey, his wife, and others as
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provided
Southeast

in

the

Uniform

Quarter

of

Real

Section

Estate

Contract,

28, Township

all

of

the

7 South, Range 2

West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.

Payment provided herein,

however,

terms

contained

is
in

to

be

the

upon

the

September

same
14,

1977

and

conditions

contract

and

it

as
is

recognized that those payments are not all due at the present
time and that the payments will be made at the rate of $350.92
per month until paid in full.

DATED this

1-7

day of dt^K^X^V^l?87 .
BY THE COURT:

^EORGEEETMI
E. /B^LLIF
Judge
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ADDENDUM NO.

2

': •;• eci
JAMES R. BROWN (#456)
JARDINE, LINEBAUGH, BROWN & DUNN
Attorneys for Defendant Keith Gurr
370 East South Temple, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7700
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
LEE A. FITZGERALD and
HELEN FITZGERALD, his wife,

AMENDED
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiffs,
vs.
BOYD CORBETT and KEITH GURR,
and UTAH RANCHLANDS,

Civil No. 63914
Judge George E. Ballif

Defendants.
The above-entitled matter came on for trial before the
Honorable George E. Ballif on the 24th day of October, 1985,
and continued from time-to-time until the 6th day of November,
1986 when the matter was finally concluded by way of additional
testimony
matter

and final argument.

under

advisement

and

The Court having taken the
fully

considered

the same now

hereby makes its:

130

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiffs are husband and wife and have entered

into certain contractual negotiations with Defendants.
2.

The Defendants agreed to purchase certain real

property located in Utah County, which purchase agreement was
the subject matter of prior litigation before this Court in the
matter entitled Boyd Corbett and Keith Gurr, individuals, and
Utah Ranchlands, a partnership, v. Lee A. Fitzgerald and Helen
Fitzgerald,

his wife,

Perry

G.

Fitzgerald

and

Carolyn

S.

Fitzgerald, his wife, Civil No. 50224.
3.

The trial court, Judge J. Robert Bullock, sitting

without a jury in Civil No. 50224, rendered a decision in May
of

1982

affecting

obligations.

the

parties'

contractual

rights

and

Judge J. Robert Bullock entered a second judgment

dated June 25, 1982, Plaintiffs1 Exhibit No. 1.

Defendants

herein, through counsel, filed a Notice of Appeal, No. 18,529,
in the Supreme Court of the State of Utah after Judge J. Robert
Bullock had rendered the decision in May, 1982, but prior to
the time that Judge J. Robert Bullock had entered a judgment,
Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 1, on June 25, 1982.

After the entry

of the judgment by J. Robert Bullock, Defendants herein filed
an appeal with the Utah Supreme Court, No. 19,594.
4.

Appeals No. 18,529 and No. 19,594 were dismissed

by order of the Utah Supreme Court on November 1, 1982.
5.
Uniform

Defendants in this action purchased, under several

Real

Estate

Contracts,
-2-

certain

properties

from

Plaintiffs and in turn sold various parcels thereof to third
parties who are not parties to this litigation.
6.

A

major

concern

of

all

parties, both

in the

preceding litigation and this litigation, is the rights of the
innocent

purchasers

who

were

to

receive

title

through

Defendants in this action from the purchase of real property
from Plaintiffs.
7.

Defendants

herein

were

dissatisfied

with

the

decision of May 1983 and filed the notices of appeal primarily
to have reviewed by the Utah Supreme Court the question of
"innocent third parties" to whom they had sold certain parcels
of the property

being purchased from Plaintiffs since that

question had not been answered by the earlier litigation.
8.

That parties, after the notices of appeal had been

filed, negotiated and entered into an agreement which appears
as Exhibit No. 11 entitled Settlement Agreement.
9.

The Plaintiffs acknowledged that they executed the

document in the presence of Mr. Corbett on or around September
10, 1982, the date it bears.
10.

Mr. Corbett testified that within 24 hours of the

Corbett/Fitzgerald signing, Mr. Gurr signed the document.
11.

At the time of the execution of Exhibit No. 11, on

or about September 10, 1982, there was a pending appeal before
the Supreme Court filed by the Defendants.
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12.

After the Settlement Agreement, Exhibit No. 11,

had been executed, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Dismiss the
appeal on October 18, 1982, and the Defendants herein allowed
to go unopposed said motion to dismiss the appeal, and the
appeal was duly dismissed by the Utah Supreme Court consistent
with the language of the Settlement Agreement, Exhibit No. 11.
13.

Subsequent to the dismissal, Plaintiffs Leland A.

Fitzgerald, wrote two letters to the Defendants which appear as
Exhibits 19 and 20, acknowledging the dismissal of the case
before the Utah Supreme Court and inquiring about a list of
purchasers

on

contracts

referred

to

in

the

Settlement

Agreement, Exhibit 11.
14.

The clear intent from Exhibit No. 11 and Exhibits

19 and 20 is that Plaintiffs would honor the outstanding third
party contracts and that any purported limiting language in
Exhibits

19

"consider

and

20

honoring

of

"honor

(Murdock)

all

legitimate

contract

if

it

claims" and
was

at

his

residence within five days" would simply go to the manner in
which performance could reasonably be expected to take place
and that reasonable times to tender them and consider their
authenticity would be matters based upon reasonableness under
the circumstances rather than views of Plaintiffs as expressed
in those letters.
15.

Subsqeuent to September 10, 1982, Plaintiffs were

paid $49,000 on the DuPratt contract, and Defendants offered to
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make payment in to court of the three annual installments of
$3,667 for the payment of the 320 acres.

There is good and

valuable consideration to support the agreement which appears
as Exhibit No. 11.
16.

Some of the provisions of the contract have been

performed to date and the court finds as fact that Defendants
have attempted to perform the remainder of the provisions and
have offered to make payment and stand ready, willing and able
to perform the remaining provisions.
17.
Defendants

That
had

there
entered

are

five

into

with

contracts
innocent

of

which

third

the
party

purchasers which contracts should be honored pursuant to the
terms and conditions of Exhibit 11 and they are as follows:
a.

James D. Alvey and Judy R. Alvey contract,

dated September 14, 1977, appears as Exhibit 15;
b.

James

E.

Pratt

contract,

entered

into

on

August 15, 1981, appears as Exhibit 16;
c.

Vern H. Bolinder contract, dated December 2,

1977, which appears as Exhibit 17;
d.

Dale E. Beus contract, dated May 27, 1981,

which appears as Exhibit 24;
e.

Lynn N. Murdock and Mina S. Murdock contract,

dated December 15, 1978, which appears as Exhibit 30.
18.

Plaintiffs are entitled to any and all payments

due or to become due from and after September 10, 1982 on any
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of the five contracts, and upon receipt of those payments,
Plaintiffs

and

each

of

them

are

to

convey

to

the

five

purchasers from Defendants the real property as described in
the contracts.
19.

In final argument in the original case, counsel

for Plaintiffs urged to the court to adopt the Fitzgerald's
position and stated to the court:
We, Mr. and Mrs. Fitzgerald, do not want the
persons who have bought from Corbett and
Gurr to be hurt. And so we are suggesting
to the court than an equitable verdict on
termination would be if the court would
terminate Corbett and Gurr out and enter as
part of that termination order that Lee and
Helen Fitzgerald honor all of the contracts
that Corbett and Gurr have entered into with
innocent bona fide purchasers of property
under that contract. And they will do so
and they are willing to do it for the
remaining unpaid balance.
If the persons
have paid it all and not got their title,
he'll just give them their title for
nothing. If they've paid all but the last
payment, he will take the last payment and
give them their title. So that no persons
will be hurt as a result of the terminating
of the Corbett and Gurr contract. They will
all be honored, if they are bona fide
purchasers.
I'm
not
talking
about
contractors that like the price, I'm talking
about bona fide purchasers of land who would
be purchasers."
20.

The foregoing quote by counsel for Plaintiff in

the original proceeding is not an agreement made in open court,
but is background for the interpretation of Exhibit No. 11, and
the authenticity

of the document, Exhibit 11, which is the

compromise of the dispute between the parties while the matter
was on appeal.
-6-

21.

That as a result of the entering into Exhibit No.

11 , and the refusal by Plaintiffs to honor the contracts and
accept the payments tendered by Defendants, Defendant Corbett
filed of

record

two "notices of

interest" which

appear as

Exhibits No. 2 and 3.
22.

That Exhibits 2 and 3 do not constitute a valid

lis pendens.
23.
have been

Plaintiffs have failed to show any damages that
incurred as a result of the filing by Defendant

Corbett of the "notices of interest."

WHEREFOREf

the

Court

having

found

the

foregoing

Findings of Facts, now hereby enters its:

CONCLDSIONS OF LAW
1.

Plaintiffs are entitled to removal of the notices

of interest.
2.

Plaintiffs are not entitled to any damages as a

result of the recordation of said notices of interest.
3.
11,

That the agreement between the partiesf Exhibit

is a valid

contract between the parties and that the

parties on both sides are entitled to a specific performance of
the same and that the five purchasers of the parcels delineated
in Exhibits 15, 16, 17, 24 and 30 are entitled to have the
property deeded to them upon payment of any and all obligations

-7-

that were due and owing as of September 10, 1982.

That the

James D. Alvey and Judy R. Alvey contract had a balance due as
of

September

10, 1982

of

$17,279.91.

That

all

payments

received from and after that date should be the property of
Plaintiffs and each of them.

Upon full payment by James D.

Alvey and Judy R. Alvey, as provided in Exhibit 15, Plaintiffs
are to deed to the Alveys said property as described in Exhibit
15.
4.

That the property described in Exhibit 16 to James

F. Pratt, Exhibit 17 to Vern H. Bolinder, Exhibit 24 to Dale E.
Beus, Exhibit 30 to Lynn N. Murdock and Mina S. Murdock, his
wife, were all paid in full prior to September 10, 1982, and
Plaintiffs

are

directed

to

deed

to

said

individuals

the

property as described in the respective contracts.
5.

That Defendants and each of them are to pay to the

Plaintiffs the sum of $11,000 in an exchange therefore and upon
payment of the same, Plaintiffs are to deed to the Defendants
320 acres consisting of the Southwest Quarter of the Southeast
Quarter and the West half except for the Southwest Quarter of
the Northwest Quarter of Section 3, Township 8 South, Range 2
West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.
6.

Defendants are entitled to their costs in this

proceeding.
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DATED

this

X ~/

day of October, 1987.
BY THE COURT:
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ADDENDUM NO.

3

DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

' .I i i. » •

BOYD CORBETT and KEITH GURR,
individuals, and UTAH RANCHLANDS,
a Partnership,
Plaintiffs,

Civil No. 50224

!'s.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
LEE A. FITZGERALD and HELEN
1'ITZGERALD, his wife, PERRY
(;. FITZGERALD and CAROLYN S.
FITZGERALD,

his wife,

Defendants.

SM-

Throughout this Memorandum Plaintiffs Corbett and
S'urr will be referred to as P, Defendant Leland Fitzgerald
\s D, and Third Party Defendant as PF.
On January 31, 1977, D purchased 12,940 acres of
and located in Cedar Valley from Richard McKinney.

Under

that contract, the land covered thereby was to be released
':o D as follows:
1.

24 40-acre tracts (960 acres) upon receipt of
$75,000 down payment on or before April 1,
1977; and,

2.

10 40-acre tracts (400 acres) upon receipt of
each $30,000 annual payment to be made on or
before February 11, 1978, and ea^h year thereafter.

One quarter section (160 acres) by the Hillside
.Stake Farm was to be released first, and the balance to be
released beginning on the south side working northward.
On February 1, 1977, the following day, D entered
:'.nto an earnest money agreement with P for the sale of a
portion of the property covered under the McKinney contract.
Shortly thereafter, D received two checks amounting to
?10,000, the amount shown as earnest money.

This agreement
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granted to P/buyer a one-year option to purchase an additional
L0,300

acres of property covered in the McKinney contract.

Under the terms of the earnest money agreement, P was to pay
0 $100,000 no later than May 1, 1977 and another $100,000
no later than July 1, 1977, at which time D was to release
certain portions of the McKinney property to P.

D testified

Lhat on the due date of the first payment, Corbett (P) failed
'.o appear at Draper Bank with the money and therefore that
<>urr (P) agreed that the earnest money should be forfeited.
However, on May 13, 1977, shortly after the due
•late of the first $100,000 payment under the earnest money
agreement, a contract was negotiated between D/seller and
P/buyer for the sale of 3,140 acres of the property covered
under the McKinney contract, which contract along with others
incorporated most of the property covered under the earnest
Money agreement.

By the terms of the May 13 contract, P was

i.o pay $136,000 down and $16,600 plus interest ($39,350
.he first year) on June 1, 1978, 1979, and 1980, and $33,200
hereafter until paid in full - the full price being $461,000.
'Jpon the closing on June 7, 1977, P did not have $136,000 cash
md D therefore accepted a one-month note for $62,556,
ipparently the difference between the full down payment and
} payment to be made on P's behalf by Curtis Young.

D does

not acknowledge receipt of the $73,400 payment and claims he
-eceived no additional money until August 24, 1977 when P
paid $30,000.

On September 2, 1977 D claims P paid an

ldditional $34,676.50 on the May 13 contract down payment.
The note was renewed until January 2, 1978, but remains
mpaid.
The May 13 contract was ambiguous as to D's obligation
,o release and deed property to P.

The contract made apparently

conflicting demand that D release 380 acres upon closing and
-elease one acre for each $116.87 of principal paid.

D

-eleased 380 acres upon closing, but no further releases
have been made.

D was required to release and deed to P

142 acres each June 1 concurrent with Pfs payment.

No

additional payments or deeds were exchanged relative to the
Hay 13 contract.
In August 1977, D sold to P 320 acres of the
McKmney property which was not covered in any other contract.
*"hese 320 acres were part of the 960 acres due D from McKinney
»>pcm down payment.

Although D delivered title to P, D received

only a portion of the purchase price and a note for the
balance.

This note, in the amount of $3,856.90, came due on

fanuary 2, 1978, the same day as the note on the May 13
contract, but also remains unpaid.
On March 6, 1978, P sold 2/3 of the May 13 contract
property, a total of 2,240 acres, to PF.

When PF became

aware of contract disputes relative to the May 13 contract
between P and D, he failed to make the payment to P required
on September 6, 1978.

Instead, PF made the payment to D.

On October 6, 1978 P terminated PF's interest in the property
"or failure to make payment.

P offered to rescind the contract

vith PF by returning the property traded to P as down payment
but PF refused.
During the period of time between June 7, 1977v
'execution of the May 13 contract) and June 1, 1978 (the due
date of the first payment under the May 13 contract) disputes
arose between P and D. the disputes centered on the crediting
of P for the $10,000 earnest money, P's willingness to pay
on the notes relating to both the closing of the May contract
and payment on the August contract, and D's ability to deliver
-eleases to additional ground as required under the May
contract.
These disputes came to a head following the June
L, 1978 due date of the first installment payment on the May 13
contract.

On that date P was to pay D $16,600 plus interest

or a total of $39,350.

In return D was obligated to release

md deed one acre of ground for each $116.87 of principal
-eceived, or about 142 acres.

When P failed to make the

•7i<:

June 1, 1978 payment within the 30-day grace period, D sent
a notice of termination to P.
Tiect statutory requirements.

P claims this notice did not
A meeting ensued shortly

thereafter on July 10, 1978 at which time P claimed to be
teady, willing, and able to perform, but that D could not
produce the required releases.

D claimed he had the deeds

it this meeting ready to convey, but would not give them to
P because P wanted credit for the $10,000 earnest money.
The escrow agent present at this meeting testified that she
did not see the deeds and that when she later checked, no
deeds had been recorded by D.

On August 3, 1978, P wrote

i letter to the escrow agent stating that P would pay D when
3 could show where P had been credited for the $10,000
2arnest money.

On January 15, 1979, D filed the notice of

termination against P, which P also claims was defective.
^o further payments or releases have been made under the May
L3 contract.
During this period of dispute under the May 13
contract, more specifically on September 6, 1977, P and D
2ntered into an option contract whereby P was granted an optioi
:o purchase an additional 6,380 acres of the property covered
jnder the McKinney contract.

The option was to be exercised

by written notice from P to D on January 15, 1978, at which
:ime a $100,000 down payment was apparently due.

Between

the time the option contract was entered into and the time
It was to be exercised, P, with D's knowledge, sold some of
:he ground covered under the option to several third parties.
Tn particular, P had arranged to trade a portion of the option
property to McOmber for a motel.

P needed releases to 400

icres of the property covered under the McKinney contract in
ijrder to make the trade.

Under the option contract, all

-eleases granted after execution of the option contract were
*:o be in accordance with D's contract with McKinney.

As of

:he execution date of the option, McKinney was obligated to
have provided D with 960 acres, most of which D had already
f*old

and deeded to P under the May 13 contract (380 acres),

land the August contract (320 acres) i^- The evidence^indicates
that another 160 acres of the 960 released to D, which were
Kot covered under any contract between P and D, were sold to
i third party.

Thus, as of the execution date of the option,

•lcKinney was not obligated to provide releases to more than
100 acres of the property covered under the option.
However, on February 11, 1978 upon Dfs payment of
?30,000 to McKinney, McKinney was obligated to release another
'4OO acres to D, and therefore to P if the option had been
exercised.

According to P, these 400 acres were to include

^he property which he had traded to McOmber.

Prior thereto,

In December of 1977, D had advised P that he was having
trouble getting the releases from McKinney.

As a result,

P was unwilling to turn over the $100,000 down payment on
t:he option to D, unless D could produce deeds to the 400
lcres due D from McKinney on February 11, 1978.
15

In addition,

claims D paid McKinney on January 4, 1978 in advance of the

January 15, 1978 execution date on the option and that therefore D was obligated to deliver the 400 acres on the execution
late.

McKinney, in fact, did not deliver the releases in

iccordance with his contract with D.
Although no written notice that P intended to
exercise the option was given to D, P claims they tendered
performance as of the execution date by depositing with the
escrow agent a blank check made out to D (with available
funds sufficient to cover the check) and by instructing the
escrow agent to issue the check if D could produce releases
to the 400 acres.
P now seeks specific performance of the May
jontract and the September option, and alternatively, damages.
D counterclaims to recover on the unpaid notes, to terminate
dny clauns P might have to the option property, and to recover
the balance owing on the May 13 contract or, in the alternative,
to quiet title to the May 13 contract property in D according
to the termination notice.
As to P's claim against PF, P seeks to enforce

7
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paragraph 16A of the Uniform Real Estate Contract^which
Releases him from any obligation to convey propertyJTand
allows P to retain all payments as liquidated damages. PF
ceeks to recover the difference between the value of the
property he gave and the value of the property he received.
In the event the May 13 contract is enforced, PF seeks judgment for the difference between the rescission amount, as
(escribed above, and the amount owing to P upon reinstatement
<>f the March contract.
All parties seek to recover attorney fees.
EARNEST MONEY AND OFFER TO PURCHASE
The Court is of the opinion that the earnest money
igreement was replaced by several subsequent contracts by
tacit, if not expressf agreement of the parties.

There is some

question, therefore, as to whether or not either party has
'.hown by a preponderance of the evidence a meeting of the
Minds with respect to the $10,000 earnest money essential
» o a finding by the Court of an enforceable contract with
•espect thereto.

However, the Court believes that the evidence

loes preponderate in favor of the proposition that D gave P
*redit for the $10,000 by reducing the purchase price of the
and under the May 13 contract from $471,000 to $461,000,
ind therefore, the issue is moot.
MAY 13 CONTRACT
The language of paragraph 20 of the May 13 contract
s ambiguous as to the obligations of each party at the time
)f execution.

By the terms thereof seller is to release and

«lced to buyer "one (1) acre for each $116.87 principal,
-eduction paid hereunder."

The contract further states that

'concurrent with the execution of this agreement Seller
,hall release and deed to Buyer title to the following
Jescribed land:", which included 380 acres of specific property.
The ambiguity lies in the amount of property D is required
-o release and deed to P upon payment of the $136,000 down
payment

If the "one-acre-for-each-$116.87-principal-reduction"

:lause operates independent of the "concurrent-with-execution"
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clause, and principal is construed to mean the full purchase
price of $461,000 rather than the balance of $325,000, then
upon execution D would be required to release *nd deed to P
:.n excess of 1163 acres.

If the "one-acre-for-each-$116.87-

principal-reduction" clause applies only to the balance of
!:he $325,000, then D would only be required upon execution
«:o release and deed 380 acres as described.
The evidence preponderates toward the latter view
:

or the following reasons:
1.

Under the first interpretation, D would have

had to release and deed to P upon execution more ground than
1' would have paid for.
!U50 per acre.

The purchase price of the ground was

At that rate P would have paid for about

<)07 acres but would have received releases and deeds to at
.east 1163 acres upon execution of the contract.
2.

There is no evidence that upon closing P

demanded more than 380 acres or made any arangements for the
-elease of more ground prior to the initial payment.
3.

The term "principal" generally applies to an

amount financed against which interest is charged.

D financed

'5325,000 not $461,000.
4.

Under the first interpretation, all deeds

would have been transferred when less than 807* of the purchase
price had been paid.

However, under the latter interpretation,

:he last of the property would have been transferred concurrent
with the final payment.
Based on the foregoing interpretation of the contract,
;he Court finds that neither party was in breach prior to
June 1, 1978, the date the first installment payment became
• lue,

D had performed his duty to that point by deeding 380

acres' to P.

P's counterperformance was the payment of $136,000.

Although D signed the May 13 contract which acknowledged
'receipt of $136,000, the money was not received, and the
evidence indicates that neither party expected to receive
It until some unspecified time after closing.

Apparently,
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$73,400 of the down payment was to be paid by Curtis Young
im P's behalf.

The balance of the $136,000 was given by P

l:o D in the form of a promissory note in the amount of
!

?62,556 ($73,400 + $62,556 = $135,956).
Although the evidence shows 1) that D has never

been paid on the note, the renewal of which came due on
January 2, 1978, and 2) that Curtis Young and others have
not paid more than $64,676.50 of the alleged $73,400, the
•Jourt believes D acquiesced to P's method of making the down
bayment.

There is no evidence that D demanded P's

Performance prior to June 1, 1978.

And, neither of D's

rermination notices referred to delinquency on the down
bayment.

D's first notice to P dated June 29, 1978 states,

'If all payments due under this contract are not paid in full
immediately, this contract will be rescinded..."
Lt does not state what payments D considered due.

Unfortunately,
However,

It is dated the day before the expiration of the 30-day grace
period relative to the June 1, 1978 payment.

The next notice

dated July 31, 1978 referenced only the "Payment due June 1,
L978," although no further payments had been made between the
dates of the two notices.
The critical issue relative to the May 13 contract
Is whether or not either party placed the other in breach
':>y tendering performance required as of the June 1, 1978
installment payment.

It is clear to the Court that D was

obligated to release and deed 142 acres to P upon each June
1 payment of $16,600 plus interest starting in 1978, and
continuing until 1981 when the acreage and the payment were
to double.

In the Court's view of the law, obligations

to pay and obligations to release and deed property which
become simultaneously due are generally considered conditions
concurrent.

Specifically, it is the Court's opinion that

D's duty to release and deed property to P did not arise
until P came forth with the payment and, conversely, P's
duty to make the payment did not arise until D came forth

with the releases and deeds.
According to Williston,
"It is one of the consequences of concurrent
conditions that a situation may arise where
no right of action ever arises against either
party. Since a conditional tender is necessary
to put either party in default, so long as both
parties remain inactive, neither is liable and
neither has acquired a right of action. Moreover, the possibility of putting either party
in default will cease if the delay is too long.
It may be supposed by the terms of the contract
the concurrent performances were to be rendered
on a day fixed, or it may be supposed that no
time was stated for performance. Under the
first supposition (which is the case here) if
time was of the essence of the contract both
parties will be discharged unless one or the
other takes the initiative and makes a conditional tender at or about the time stated in
the contract."
Williston on Contracts, Section 832, Sufficiency of Readiness and Willingness to Perform, pp. 96-100.
The situation described by Williston fits the facts
3f this case.

D failed at any time to tender performance of

lis obligation to "release and deed" property to P upon the
June 1, 1978 payment.

D's alleged tender at the July 10,

1978 meeting was insufficient because D did not have the
•\bility to perform at that time.

The escrow agent's testimony

.vas that no deeds had been recorded from McKinney to D upon
search following the July meeting.

D did not allege nor did

the evidence show any other attempt on the part of D to tender
his performance.
P also failed to tender performance of the June 1,
1978 payment.

Assuming P had the present ability to perform

and that D had waived any objection to the method of payment,
P's alleged tender at the July 10, 1978 meeting failed because
Lt was contingent upon performance to which P was not entitled.
"A tender, to be good, must be free from any condition which
the tenderer does not have a right to insist upon."

Sieverts

v. White, 2 Utah 2d 351, 273 P.2d 974. Apparently P's tender
was contingent upon two conditions, neither of which P was
entitled to.

The conditions were 1) credit for the $10,000

earnest money and 2) release of deeds for payment of the down

payment according toithe ' Vme -acre-for-each-$U6>,87r of£)
principal-paid^'"clause^

(See discussion 'piOftej^cggE&sBg

bretation of the May 13 contract, above)

The, escrow agent;,

restified that, based on her recollection of the July 10,
L978 meeting, "(T)here was some dispute over the $10,000
ind some dispute as to whether or not Lee actually had
o get some of the land released from McKinney or not.n
»'s letter of July 21, 1978 substantiates and clarifies P's
:onditions.

In the letter P states that $73,400 was paid down

'md that $16,600 of principal was tendered and therefore
le was entitled to release of 770 acres ($73,400 + $16,600/
$116.87 = 770), less the 380 acres received with the down
iciyment, or 390 acres.

Under our interpretation of the

contract, D's counterperformance relative to any of the down
payment (the alleged payment of $73,400) was satisfied upon
receipt of the initial 380 acres.

P therefore had a right to

:>nly 142 acres upon the June 1, 1978 payment and not 390
acres as he requested.
The parties clearly agreed that time was of the
essence.

(See paragraph 16 of the contract)

endered performance at the specified time.

Neither party
The first

llleged tender did not occur until 40 days after the due
late of the June payment and 10 days after the expiration
of the grace period.

At that time D could not produce the

required deeds and P was asking for ground and earnest money
credit to which he was not entitled.

No further tender was

-nade of the performance required by either party on June 1,
1978
Where neither party performed, or tendered performance
in a timely manner, and time was of the essence, it is the
opinion of the Court that both parties were discharged of
their duties under the contract, and the parties should be
left where they are found unless the Court in equity should
decide that such would amount to an unjust enrichment of
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one of the parties.

"Under some circumstances a quasi

contract arises independent of the intention of the parties
where a special contract has been partly performed and such
quasi contract is founded upon the doctrine of unjust enrichment.

The basis of liability under a quasi contract resulting

."rom a part performance of a special contract is the benefit
conferred upon a defendant by the part performance of a
special contract, and not the detriment incurred by the
plaintiff."

66 Am. Jur. 2d, Restitution and Implied Contracts,

Section 12.

Partial or defective performance of contract,

•). 954.
Williston adds,
"Indeed, wherever justice requires compensation
to be given for property or services rendered
under a contract, and no remedy is available by
an action on the contract, restitution of the
value of what has been given must be allowed."
Williston on Contracts, Section 1479, Rescission 6c Restitution, No Liability in Contract, at pp. 271-272. Also,
Williston clearly sets forth the elements of a claim for
.injust enrichment:
"1.

A benefit conferred upon the defendant by
the plaintiff;

2.

An appreciation or knowledge by the defendant of the benefit; and

3.

The acceptance or retention by the defendant
of the benefit under such circumstances as to
make it inequitable for the defendant to retain
the benefit without payment of its value."

Id., at 276.
These elements are present in this case.

The

evidence shows that D has received a benefit, with knowledge
and appreciation of such benefit, which is disproportionate
to the value of what he gave up so as to make its retention
inequitable.

To date, D has received the following benefit

under the May 13 contract:
earnest money

$10,000.00

check (Exhibit 25)

30,000.00

check (Exhibit 26)

34,483.13

check (Exhibit 28)

193.37

title policy

1,387.50

escrow fee

75 00

recording fee

12,50

$76,151.50
In return, D has given P title to 380 acres,
valued at $150 per acre at the time of contract or $57,000;
and, the use of $62,556 until the contract failed, valued at
$7,670 81. Adding these values shows a total value given
}y D of $64,670.81
The difference between the value D gave ($64,670.81)
ind the value he received ($76,151.50) is $11,480.69.

The

Court concludes that D has been unjustly enriched by this
amount and, therefore, grants judgment in favor of P for
$11,480 69
In order to avoid adding to Dfs unjust enrichment,
the Court denies D's prayer for judgment on the delinquent
$62,556 promissory note signed by P as part of the down payment on the May 13 contract.
Also, as part of this decision, the Court
acknowledges D's offer in open court to honor the contracts
covering the May 13 contract property made between P and
all "innocent and bona fide purchasers prior to trial
regardless of the amount paid to P," and expects D to perform
according to this offer.
THE SEPTEMBER OPTION
The Court denies Pfs request for specific performance
of the September option because the option was not exercised
according to its terms and P failed to tender performance
as of the execution date, January 15, 1978.

It is elementary

contract law that an offeror may choose the method of acceptance, and such method must be followed unless waived by the
offeror

More specifically, "This court has long adhered to

the rule that an option must be exercised in accordance with
its terms." Nance v. Schoonover, 521 P.2d 896, Equitable
Realty, Inc. v

Nielsen, 519 P.2d 423, 30 U.2d 433

The

contract clearly states that the option is to be exercised
by written notice to D on or before January 15, 1978.
is no evidence that P gave the required written notice

There

Although P claims that D actually participated in several
of P's contract sales of the option property prior to the
Execution date and that D, even after execution date,
'ndicated that he would work things out, the Court finds
Lhat the evidence is insufficient to sustain a waiver under
either contention.
The Court also concludes that by the terms of the
September option P was obligated to tender $100,000 to
Bxercise the option, but D was not concurrently obligated
to tender releases to 400 acres as P demanded.

Under the

terms of the September option it is not entirely clear that
2ither the $100,000 down payment or releases according to the
McKinney contract were required on the execution date.
However, the evidence indicated that the parties thought the
$100,000 was due at that time, and such is the most reasonable
interpretation of the option language.

But, the option did

not create a concurrent condition that D release and deed
400 acres of ground to P as P alleges.

The contract clearly

states that "releases granted after execution of contract
shall be in accordance: with the McKinney contract.

As of

the execution date on the September option, D could not have
been obligated to deliver more than 100 acres.

At that time,

McKinney was obligated to have provided 960 acres to D.
Although D had received title to this property, most of it
had already been deeded to P under other contracts; 380 acres
upon closing of the May 13 contract and 320 acres upon closing
of the August sale.

D also sold 160 acres of the McKinney

property, not covered in any contract between P and D, to a
third party.

Therefore, at most, D could have delivered

title to 100 acres upon execution of the option, January 15,
1978.
P claims the option agreement created concurrent
conditions, that D was obligated to produce 400 acres upon
payment of $100,000 down, and therefore that a conditional
tender was sufficient to place D in breach.

It is P's

Contention that these obligations became concurrent because
j) made his $30,000 payment to McKinney on January 4, 1978
rather than February 11, 1978 when it became due. Therefore,
P was entitled to the 400 acres to which D became entitled
upon payment.

This argument is unconvincing because at the

rime the option was entered (September 7, 1977), P could not
have predicted or required D's early payment.

Therefore,

the parties upon entrance of the contract clearly did not
contemplate concurrent conditions, and the law should not
Imply such against the intent of the parties at the time the
:ontract was entered into.
Even if a conditional tender were sufficient to
nlace D in breach, P's alleged tender did not satisfy legal
requirements.

For a conditional tender to operate it must

be communicated to the other party.
Section 1, Tender.

See 74 Am. Jur. 2d,

"Tender implies the physical act of

offering the money or the thing to be tendered, but this cannot
-est in implication alone."
.ind Offer.

Id., Section 7, Production

The escrow agent's testimony was that she did

not tender the blank check to D. Absent evidence that P
rendered it, no tender was made.

Also, a blank check in the

instant case was probably insufficient tender.

Although

i check is good tender when not objected to (Sieverts v.
White, 273 P.2d 974, 2 U.2d 351), the opportunity to object
-nust be afforded the creditor.

"There is no waiver where the

creditor is not present to object."
Section 10, p. 553.

74 Am. Jur. 2d, Tender,

Because no meeting took place on the

Execution date, D was not present when the check was deposited,
Ind the presence of the check was not communicated to D prior
to the execution date, D could not have waived his right to
Cull tender.
THE MARCH CONTRACT
The Court finds that the March contract created
the following obligations:
1.

Upon execution of the March contract, P was

obligated to deed 60 acres to PF in partial payment for the

74
745

exchange property

deeded from PF to P at that time, valued

at $252,000. Also, in return for; the exchange property
V was obligated to deed an additional 640 acres to PF, 60
acres "at such time as Seller is able to obtain releases
from RLC Investment, Inc." and 580 acres "to be released
to Buyer at such time as Seller obtains release of said
acreage from Leland A

Fitzgerald" in accordance with the

May contract.
2

Six months after execution of the contract,

specifically on September 6, 1978, PF was obligated to pay
S23,238 75 plus interest, and to continue to pay that amount
<Mch March 6th and September 6th until paid in full.

In

ieturn P was to release and deed one acre for each $368
principal reduction paid, or about 63 acres upon each paynent

These obligations created concurrent conditions; that

s, P's duty to deliver 63 acres upon each payment did not
irise until PF came forth with the payment and, conversely,
T's duty to make each installment payment did not arise
mtil P came forth with the deeds.
Under this interpretation of the contract, the
'Jourt concludes, as it has with respect to the May 13
ontract, that neither party made a conditional tender of
oerformance required on September 6, 1978 sufficient to place
.he other party in breach, and therefore, neither party has
I cause of action against the other.
have tendered performance

PF never claimed to

Rather, PF claimed that he did

not have to pay P the September payment, and therefore, paid
Lt to Lee Fitzgerald because of P's prospective inability to
jeliver the required deeds

PF was aware of the dispute

between P and D on the May 13 contract and that P would be
Jnable to perform on the March contract unless those disputes
</ere resolved

Utah law is clear that if the vendor has

'so lost or encumbered his title that he will not be able
to fulfill his contract, he cannot insist that the purchaser

^continue to make payments where it is obvious that his own
performance will not be forthcoming."

Marlowe Investment

Corporation v. Radmall, 485 P.2d 1402, 26 Utah 2d 124. And,
a "buyer should not be heard to complain unless it appears
I hat it will be impossible or at least highly unlikely that
the seller will be unable to perform his contract when he
s called upon to do so."
fJ.2d 417, 30 Utah 2d 47.

Corporation Nine v. Taylor, 513
In that case, the fact that the

seller had sold to a third party some of the land previously
sold, but not yet deeded,

to plaintiff/buyer was not suf-

ficient to show that the seller would be unable to perform
when his obligation arose.
The key factual issue here is whether or not P's
performance was impossible or sufficiently unlikely to excuse
0 from his obligation to pay P, or at least make a conditional
render.

If the sale of land to a third party was insufficient

:o show impossibility or sufficient unlikeliness, a fortiori,
:ontract disputes which were yet unresolved would also be
Insufficient.
PF also claimed that P breached his covenant,
under paragraph 11, that he would not "default in the payment
of his obligations against said property."

This contention

falls short because P's performance which was concurrent with
D's obligation to provide certain deeds, never was called
for by D tendering those deeds.

(See discussion of the

May 13 contract.)
PF also claimed that under paragraph 18 of the
contract, he had the right to pay D directly and receive
credit for such payment.

But, paragraph 18 does not apply

because it specifically excludes the right to make payment
relative to liens or encumbrances "herein provided for or
referred to," and the $325,000 owed to D is obviously
referred to in the contract.
As to P's performance, P never claimed to have
tendered the deeds required concurrent with the September 6,

1978 payment, and tfiare ia 110 evidence that P ever did tender
those deeds. Therefore, neither party placed tfcre other in
breach by tendering performance in a timely manner or other
wise, and the Court must leave the parties where it finds
them, unless such would amount to an unjust enrichment of
the other.
PF, at the time the contract was entered into,
deeded property to P valued by the parties at $252,000.

In

return PF has received 60 acres valued at the time of contract
at $320 per acre, or $19,200. Given the disparity between
the value of what P has received and the value of what P has
paid, the Court concludes that P has been unjustly enriched
and that leaving the parties where they are found would be
tantamount to enforcement of an otherwise unenforceable
forfeiture provision.

See Kay v. Woods, 549 P.2d 709;

Perkins v. Spencer, 243 P.2d 446, 121 Utah 468; Jacobson v.
Swan, 278 P.2d 274, 2 U.2d 59.
In accordance with the foregoing analysis, the Court
concludes the following as to the March contract:
1.

P's prayer for enforcement of paragraph 16(a)

of the Uniform Real Estate Contract which would release P
from its obligations to convey the property and allow P
to retain all payments as liquidated damages, and any other
relief requested, including attorneys fees, is denied.
2.

EMs prayer for judgment for the difference

in the value of the property he delivered to P and the
value of the 60 acres he received, and attorneys fees, is
also denied.
3.

In order not to unjustly enrich P when P was

unable to perform, P is ordered to return to PF the property
received without any encumbrances and in the same condition
as when it was received

In return, ID is ordered to pay P

the contract price of $320 per acre for the 60 acres received,
or $19,200.
AUGUST SALE
Pursuant to agreement of the parties, the Court
finds with respect to the August sale as follows:
1.

P signed a note in favor of D,

7Sf

74S

iee Fitzgerald, in partial payment for property received;
chd
2.

Said Note in the amount of $3,856.90 has been

c'elinquent since January 2, 1978,
From the foregoing findings the Court grants
I 's request for judgment on the note in the amount
< £ $6,170.73 and reasonable attorneys fees in the sum of
'•600.
ATTORNEY FEES
The following principles apply to the resolution
rf the various requests for attorney fees:
1.

"Attorney's fees cannot be recovered unless

i rovided for by statute or by contract."

B & R Supply Co.

v. Bringhurst, 503 P.2d 1216, 28 U.2d 442.
2.

"The rule that judgment must be based on

findings of fact, which in turn must be based on evidence,
is applicable to awarding attorney fees."

F.M.A. Financial

Corp. v. Build, Inc., 404 P.2d 670, 17 U.2d 80.
3.

"Since both judges and lawyers have special

Inowledge as to the value of legal services, such services
•re not always required to be proven by sworn testimony, and
they are sometimes submitted upon stipulation as to the amount,
'•r the judge may fix the amount on the basis of his own knowledge and experience, and/or in connection with reference
to a bar approved schedule."
4.

Id.

"Attorney's fees may not be awarded where there

is nothing in the record to sustain the award either by way
fif evidence of by stipulation of the parties as to how the
Court may fix it." Butler v. Butler, 461 P.2d 727, 23 U.2d
. 59.
5.

"It is appropriate to apply basic principles

of contract law, namely, the creation of a contract requires
i meeting of the minds of the parties; and the burden of so
proving is upon the party who claims there was a contract,"
.Spanish Fork Packing Co. v. House of Fine Meats, Inc, , 508
I".2d 1186, 29 U.2d 312.

Applying these principles to the contracts before
the Court, the Court concludes as to each contractus 'follows:"
1.

May 13 Contract
Under the theory that attorney fees are

recoverable only if provided for by contract or statute, and
lhat basic contract principles apply as to whether or not
I.here is a contract, neither party is entitled to recover
lttomey fees.

Neither party performed, the contract expired,

and its terms became unenforceable.

Even if the contract were

enforceable, neither party placed the other in breach so as
*:o trigger the enforcement of the clause covering attorney
Tees.
2.

September Option
The contract provision providing for recovery

of attorney fees expired when the option was not timely
exercised and when P failed to tender performance.

Again,

:here is no contract or statute under which attorney fees
;an be awarded.
3.

March Contract
The analysis is identical to that under the

'lay Contract.
4.

August Sale
Reasonable attorney fees, in the amount of

$600, are recoverable by D under the terms of the delinquent
tote.
Counsel for defendant Lee Fitzgerald is directed
to prepare and submit to the Court for signature within 15
days under Rule 2.9 of the Rules of Practice appropriate
judgments and orders necessary to implement this decree,
axcept as it affects the March contract between Perry
Fitzgerald and Corbett and Gurr.

As to the latter contract,

counsel for Perry Fitzgerald will prepare said judgments
and orders.
Dated this

4~^

day of Ap*#t, 1982.

BY THE COURT:
:C:

Byron L, Stubbs, Esq.
M. Dayle Jeffs, Esq.
Robert B. Hansen, Esq.
if
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1
2
3
4
5

M. DAYbE JEFFS OF JEFFS AND JEFFS
Attorneys for Defendants^Fitzgerald
90 North 100 East
P. 0. Box 683
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone: 373-8848

6

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY

7

STATE OF UTAH

8
9
10

BOYD CORBETT and KEITH GURR,
individuals, and UTAH RANCHLANDS, a partnership,
Plaintiffs,

11
12
13
14

JUDGMENT

vs,
LEE A. FITZGERALD and HELEN
FITZGERALD, his wife, PERRY
G. FITZGERALD and CAROLYN S.
FITZGERALD, his wife,

15

Civil No,

50224

Defendants.

/

16
17

This matter came on duly and

reguarly to be heard

18
before

the

above

entitled

Court,

Judge

J,

Robert

Bullock

19
sitting without a jury on the 9th and 10th day of February,
20
1982 upon the Complaint of the plaintiffs, the Counterclaim of
21
22
23
24
25

the defendants, Lee A, Fitzgerald

and Helen Fitzgerald, and

the Counterclaim of the defendants, Perry G. Fitzgerald and
Carolyn S. Fitzgerald.

The issues of the plaintiffs and all

other parties is reserved for further trial.
heard

The Court having

the evidence, both oral and documentary, having heard

26
the arguments of counsel, having

been fully advised

in the

27
premises, and having

taken the matter under advisement, and

28
based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law hereto29
fore entered, now makes and enters the following:
30
31

S!

\2

Hi

CO

JUDGMENT
1.
defendants,

Lee

Plaintiffs are granted
A,

Fitzgerald

and

judgment

Helen

against

Fitzgerald,

the

in

the

amount of $4,709.96.
2.
tifts and

It is the judgment of the Court that plain-

defendants,

Lee A. and

Helen

Fitzgerald,

are

dis-

charged of any obligations under the May 13, 1977 Uniform Real
Estate Contract.

Said

contract

is held

to be of

no

further

force or effect.
3.

It

is

the

judgment

of

the Court

Earnest Money Agreement and Option to Purchase dated

that

the

February

1, 1977 expired for non-payment and by mutual agreement of the
parties.
4.

Plaintiffs

are

adjudged

retain the 380 acres heretofore conveyed
A. and

Helen

Fitzgerald

under

the May

to

be

entitled

to

to plaintiffs by Lee
13, 1977 Uniform

Real

Estate Contract.
5.

The

Court

rules

that

plaintiffs

have

no

interest in the remaining properties described

in the May 13,

1977 contract

in Exhibit

and more particularly

described

M M

A

attached hereto and by reference made a part hereof.
6.

The Court

rules tnat the plaintiffs have no

interest

in and

to the properties described

7,

option

more

1977

particularly

in the

described

on

September
M

Exhibit

BW

attached hereto.
7.
^warded
cluded

Except

defendants,
in

the

for

the

Lee A. and

computations

$600.00

Helen S.

of paragraph

attorney's

Fitzgerald,

-2-

and

1 above, each

shall bear their own costs and attorney's fees.

fees
in-

party

8,

All other claims encompassed

in the plead-

ings of this action between plaintiffs, Boyd Corbett and Keith
Gurr,

and

defendants,

Lee

A.

Fitzgerald

and

Helen

S.

Fitzgerald, are dismissed with prejudice, rv
Dated and signed this^<^

day ofyfery> 1982.
BY T,

Robert Bullock, Ju

CC/OMY OF UfAH )
, / * /^ffiaS
i, THE UNOfKSJGM£D^C_ _
OF UTAH COUNTY, OTAtfjetfl;
ANNCXED AND P0REGG4N9 IS K^ J[tW_,_„ „ ™ - „ . .
AH ORIGINAL DOCUME^OH
WMm^pff^f^^OjA
WITNESS MY H A N D < a D j ^ ^ C * . S A 1 ^ C O l ^ r i TtfW

3Q

DAY OF ^„fr^<&rs^;±

WIUlAMiv^UISH,

f <*^F

EXHIBIT MA"
The Northwest Quarter
South, Range 1 West,
Meridian.

of Section 31, Township 7
of the Salt Lake Base and

Lots 1, 2, 3, 4 and the East half of the Southwest
Quarter of Section 30, Township 7 South, Range 1 West
of
the
Salt
Lake
Base
and
Meridian.
Also:
Commencing at the center of Section 30, Township 7
South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian;
thence East 80 rods; thence North 100 rods? thence
West 160 rods; thence South 100 rods; thence East 80
rods to beginning.
The Northwest Quarter, the Wesc half of the Northeast
Quarter, Lots 3, 4, all of Section 19, Township 7
South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.
The North half of the Northwest Quarter, the West
half of the Northeast Quarter, the Southeast Quarter
and the South half of the Southwest Quarter, all of
Section 18, Township 7 Soutn, Range 1 West, Salt Lake
Base and Meridian.
The Northeast Quarter, the Southeast Quarter, the
South half of the Southwest Quarter, the Northwest
Quarter, all of Section 7, Township 7 South, Range 1
West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.
The Northwest Quarter of the Northeast Quarter, the
North half of the Northwest Quarter, the Southwest
Quarter of the Northwest Quarter, the Northwest
Quarter of the Southwest Quarter all of Section 6,
Township 7 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and
Meridian.
The East half of Section 28, Township 7 South, Range
2 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.
The East half of Section 2, Township 8 South, Range 2
West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.
The North half of the Northwest Quarter, the North
half of the Southeast Quarter of the Northwest
Quarter, all of Section 1, Township 8 South, Range 2
West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.
The Southwest Quarter of the Southwest Quarter of
Section 36, Township 7 South, Range 2 West, Salt Lake
Base and Meridian.

-4-

EXHIBIT "B
All of Section 22, Township 7 South, Range 2 West,
Salt Lake Base and Meridian.
All of Section 23, Township 7 South, Range 2 West,
Salt Lake Base and Meridian.
All of Section 27, Township 7 South, Range 2 West,
Salt Lake Base and Meridian.
All of Section 26, Township 7 South, Range 2 West,
Salt Lake Base and Meridian.
All of Section 34, Township 7 South, Range 2 West,
Salt Lake Base and Meridian.
All of Section 35, Township 7 South, Range 2 West,
Salt Lake Base and Meridian.
All of Section 2, Township
Salt Lake Base and Meridian.

7 South, Range 2 West,

The East half of Section 33, Township 7 South, Range
2 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.
The East half and the Southwest Quarter of Section
21, Township 7 South, Range 2 West, Salt Lake Base
and Meridian.
The Southwest Quarter of the Southwest Quarter of
Section 36, Township 7 South, Range 2 West.
All of Section 3, Township 8 South, Range 2 West,
Salt Lake Base and Meridian, excepting therefrom the
Southwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of said
section.
The North half of Section 25, Township 7 South, Range
2 West, Salt Lake base and Meridian.
The East half and the Southwest Quarter of Section
21, Township 7 South, Range 2 West, Salt Lake Base
and Meridian.
The West half of Section 24, Township 7 South, Range
2 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.
The East half of the Northwest Quarter of Section 28,
Township 7 South, Range 2 West, Salt Lake Base and
Meridian.
The South half of the Southeast Quarter of the
Northeast Quarter and the West half of the Northeast
Quarter of Section 10, Township 8 South, Range 2
West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.

1
2 II
3 II

The East half of the Northwest Quarter and the
Southwest Quauter of the Northwest Quarter of Section
12/ Township 8 South/ Range 2 West, Salt Lake Base
and Meridian.

4
5 ||
§ I

Excepting therefrom any and all oil/ gas and mineral
rights.
Excepting therefrom any and all grazing rights until
property is fenced.

7"

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
3i
32
r
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2DEFENDANFS1
EXHIBIT

NO. /3
T

<ELE AS E OF JUDG.VENT

For the sum of $4,709.96 herein paid in full on this 28th
day of September, 198 2,

We, Boyd Corbett and Keith Gurr, acting

as individuals, and doing business as Utah Ranchlands, release
the $4,70°.96 judgment against Helen S. and Lee A, Fitzgerald,
in favor of Boyd Corbett and Keith Gurr
entered on June 29, 1982 in the Fourth

and Utah Ranchlands,
District Court in and

for Utah County, Utah, Case No. 50,224
Utah Ranchlands

r 0 ^£>yo(
Boyd Co/oett,
as an individual
.for Utah-Ranchlands

Kpzta Gurtrir'-al5 an individual
for Utah Ranchlands

State of Utah
County of Salt Lake

SS.

On this 28th day of Sept. 1982 personally apoeared before r?.e
Boyd Corbett and Keith Gurr, the signers of the vi4; v_n :.rstrur.e**J"
who du.lv acknowledged to v?.s that they executed, the c?.Te.

Notary P u b l i c a t D^aper^ Ut^h
My Comm. e x p i r e s S^/
>~~v&

ADDENDUM NO. 7

FENDANrS
EXHIBITi

r

SETTfIEMENFT

AGRCEMFNT

We, G. Boyd Corbett and Keith L. Gurr, doing business as
Utah Ranchlands, hereby agree to settle all legal actions,
lawsuits, appeals to the Supreme Court, etc., concerning Leland
A, and Helen S. Fitzgerald and all their Cedar Valley property.
In consideration for settlement, We, Leland A. and Helen S.
Fitzgerald agree to give by Warranty Deed 320^a£res; located in
The SW\s of the SE1* and the W*j except for the SW!* of the NW^ all
in Section 3, T 8 S, R 2 W, SLBM.

Warranty deed will be given at

the time it is released to Leland A. and Helen S. Fitzgerald, as
per schedule with Helen Stassi and Johnel1 Yurka.
We, G. Boyd Corbett and Keith L. Gurr, agree to pay Leland
A. and Helen S. Fitzgerald, $11,000.00 in three annual installments
of $3,667.00 plus interest at 7 % on principle balance owing
beginning Feb. 1, 1983 and annually thereafter until principle
with interest is paid in

full.

This agreement subject to payment in

excess of $49,000.00

on the DuPratt contract on this 10th day of September, 1982.
t

//.ft

Fitzgerald's agree to honor all Corbett and Gurr's previous sales ^ - ^
Dated this 10th day of September, 1982.
^fM^'e^f
#Jjx
Utah RanchJands by

G. Boyd Corbett
as a partner and as an individual

^Uu^Ar^'
Keith L. Gurr
as a partner and as an individual

"

—^ yy*

land A. Fitzgerald
an individual

n/ //'

^ ~-

I l l II >K Nil II II II Il III

Ill

//

s

File # 1+579
I! IJ ''I IS?
Leland A- Fitzgerald
Helen S. Fitzgerald
$1*9,Vxl /?.

- Annual Payment from Utah Ranchlands
L» .

110.23
139.91
$U8,720.79

w > .-

•

o

Less Payment to Utah Couri ty T r e a s u r e r
t!

?!

It

If

It

ft

B-1508-A
B-1533-A

TOTAL

CUSTOMER'S RECEIPT ONLY

D . B . & T. )

Keith Chirr
E

DRAPE
n&aiJ
CT T R U S T

v ;

m
D A T E

4/ I.I

«>«(»!,, !'/i „!" (• I

hd,m.y**—

LEE FITZGERALD

Ml

,(.,•

DOL I ARS

Mlt*.

"

CASHIER'S CMB'.K

mi i in 1 1

" i" i i i

MQRANDUM Dl IL i

)T NEGOTIABLE

**

Cod* No. • j No.; ^ M o . .. j Day L Vr.
Nome; & Address

r

146. 01 ! 10 '06 ' 8 2 _;

LELAND A. FITZGERALD
208 FAST 13800 SOUTH
DRAPER, UTAH 84020

; 0030406
CHK

RECEIVED F R O M :

*

VAI ,LEY TITLE COMPANY TRUST ACCOUNT Rxl

I
CASH
I

J

mm*,.
%^v|i^

THAN. CODE

DESCRIPTION

CR-.

TO

.06.

fcNTEKPWSf

cot*

.

QUANTITY

UNITS

AUTO

67

PAYMENT ON NOTE

IOAN
NO.

65

66

33

34

48,720.79

6108

CO

f TYPE
r

GENERAL LEDGER A C C O U N T S
t&Jktu

jy*M

35

36

35

3o

MAIN

SUB

DETAIL
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I , • .- .
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'

1 \.\^';>-':-'-rr, • .PESCRtPTtON
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,,

.—i
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^W
•Y'rrl'J
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^"

At iTLirkDt7cn
AUTHORIZED

cinraArnoi
SlGNATtJRl ^^

ORIGINAL

1
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PLAINTIFFS
EXHIBIT

I NO. ^ £

}

OL

ON WnGNHCI \V /

CORBETT & GURR PAYMENTS

DATE
lQ8n

AMOUNT OWED
$

5 6 , ° 3 5 .85

7 91

-=•,551.7C
•

- -

=;

Q

DAY''

« _ "i g

,

11.34'

1981

56

1982

-4E "_: -=

1983

41, 9"4.99

Q

3 5 . 8 5 "" 7 % =

2 <:

,

':'

••-;

.

-

^

60,911.34

59,610.72 X 7% = " ] ~ ~

* 1983

DATE PAIE

^ , 5 5 .1 .7

1980

1984

.DUE

T

\TE

AMT DUE
$

i

ic.

PAID

5 6 . 610 . ~ ~

1

! OP

AMOl.

~

" divided 36:

~> p " .

= 3 , 410.45

•: 1% = 2, 9 38.24
7<

=1.057.23
=3,423.79

20 + 3450.1-3 +

:

44

480.04

57

541.50

;P

56

11,255.01

*

47

-J-Z'i-B'i

.-•3 @ day X 32 days = $ 365.76

vided ":•::

"

:-: 4 5 days =
_

-I-

"

.0-

"

.8 =

"

. 413 "

. 3E

"

:_ ;. days =

"

365.76

4 80.04

-.ys =

541.50

•-: .iuys =

450.24

=11,255.01
4 4 0.8 6

4 4 0.86

ADDKNDUM NO

I 1

•tJPREME C O U R T O F UTA1
STATK OF UTAH
SALT LAKK CITY, UTAH

November 1, 1982
OFFICE OF THE CLERK

r

i
M. DAYLE JEFFS
""TORNEY AT LAW
NORTH 100 EAST
1
OFFICE BOX 683
•J.lfi03

J

Boyd Corbett, Keith Gurr and Utah
Ranch Lands.5.„.a„.p.ax.tnersh]_p,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
Lee A, Fitzgerald, Helen Fitzgerald, hi> wife,
Perry. G.. Fj.tzgeral.d ..ancL.C.ar.Qlyn Fi tzgcral d,
his wife.
Defendants and Respondents.
This day

7
No

185.29. and...!8594

respondent ! s motion for dismissal of appeals with prejudice is granted.

Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk

"
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'

;

^ *^v

1 1982

ADDENDUM NO.

12

EXHIBIT

NO.

f

A

27171
•ana or
Mot lea of Interest la haraby glvan by Boyd Corbatt dba Utah
Ranohlanda vor ard on babalf of hit buyara and aa part of that aattlaaant
agraaaant k i t h Laland A. f l t a g a r a l d aad Malan S. f i t s g a r a l d datad
Saptambar 10, 19*2 who rain Fltagaraldt
Agraad to honor "all Corbatt*a pratloua aalaa**
Also, aa part of tha naaorandua daoialoo datad Nay *, 1982 by tha
Honorabla Robart Bui look vharaln atatad, •. . . alao, aa part of tola daolaion,
tha Court aaknottladgaa Oafandant'a (Fltagarald) offer in opan Court to honor
tha oontraota oovarlng ti>a Hay 13th oontraot nana batttaan all lnnooant aad bona
flda purohaaara prior to t r i a l raiardlaaa of tha aaount paid to r i a l n t l f f
(Corbatt), -ad axp%cU Dafondant to parfora aoaordlng to this of far."
Tha proparty ia llatad balous
1) of Saotlon 2, Township B South Banga 2 Vaat
S.LB.H. SM9 of tha Sti and tha V) axoapt for tha
SMt of tha MM) *ft Saotlon 3, Tonnahlp B South
Banga 2 Vaat S.LB.H. M| of tha IV) of Saotlon 30
Totmahlp 7 South Banga 1 Moot. SI!) of tha SMt of
Saotlon 36, Tovmahlp 7 South Banga 2 Maat, MM) of
tha MM) of Saotlon 1, Townahip B South Banga 2
Maat. M) of tha MM) of Saotlon 25, toimahip 7
Banga 2 IJaSi of tha Ufa and too SM* of tha Si) a l l
In Saotlon 30, Towaaolp 7 South Banga 1

^ o
Baa* Corbatt

STATE Of OTA*

)
too
COUMH Or SALT LAKB )
On tha 29th day of Ootobar, 1962, poraoaally oppoarad bafora
Boyd Corbott, tha algnar of tha abova lnatrunoot, who duly aokao«ladgad to
that ha asoautod tha aa**.

H**4
at: Salt Laka City, Otah
aatpn Bxplroa:

VTATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF UTAH
I, THE UNDERSIGNS* »ECORn& > HAP C O U I T Y IITAU
*C> HEREBY C » m TH>f r t AH^,Bl
^0
K^^Ti^

wrun
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In the Fourth Judicial District Court
of «b» State of Utah
In and For Utah County
BOYD CORBETT and KEITH GURR,

\

individuals, and UTAH RANCHLANDS, pkbtitf

I

a Partnership,

I

n.
LEE A. FITZGERALD and HELEN
FITZGERALD, his wife, PERRY
G. FITZGERALD and CAROLYN S.
FITZGERALD, his wife,

MINUTE ENTRY
c^j^g^

50224

>
[ DATED
November 26, 7982
I
Defcndmt I
J. Robert Bullock,
JUDGE
I
/ Reported by £# y, Qu1st> c#s ^
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

This matter came before the Court for hearing on defendants Perry G.
and Carolyn S. Fitzgerald's order to show cause. Plaintiffs Boyd Corbett and
Keith Gurr appearing in person without counsel. No one appearing for or on
behalf of the defendants. The Court passed this matter until 10:00 a.m.
This matter was recalled. The plaintiffs present without counsel.
Defendants appearing by and through attorney Robert B. Hansen.
Mr. Hansen addressed the Court in support of relief as prayed for by
defendants.
Mr. Corbett addressed the Court in his own behalf. Mr. Hansen responded
on behalf of defendants. Mr. Gurr addressed the Court 1n his own behalf. Mr. Hansen
addressed the Court further.
The Court stated this matter will be continued to allow plaintiffs to
bring Lee Fitzgerald into the matter, but Mr. Hansen may put on his expert witness
at this time with the reservation it may not be binding against Lee Fitzgerald.
Frank J. Blankenshlp was sworn and testified on direct examination by
Mr. Hansen.
Defendant's Exhibit 1 - Letter - marked.
Witness examined on cross by Mr. Corbett and by Mr. Gurr. Exhibit 1
received.
Mr. Corbett offered a copy of previous appraisal which was received into
evidence . The document was received by the Court.
This matter is continued for further hearing and taking of evidence to ^
Thursday, January 6, 1983, at 2:00 p.m., without a jury.

cc: Boyd Corbett
Keith Gurr
Robert B. Hansen, Esq.
-M. Dayle Jeffs, Esq.

RECEIVED DLC - 8 1982
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PLAINTIFF'S
EXHIBIT

I NO. tf
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY

BOYD CORBETT, KEITH GURR and
UTAH RANCH LANDS,

Civil Case Number 50,224
Plaintiffs,

Dated

-vs-

January 6, 1983

J. Robert Bullock, Judge
LEE A. FITZGERALD, HELEN
FITZGERALD, PERRY G. FITZGERALD
and CAROLYN FITZGERALD,

MINUTE ENTRY AND NOTICE

Defendants.

The hearing on the order to show cause issued by the Court on October 27,
1982, to plaintiffs, Boyd Corbett and Keith Gurr, is continued to January 20, 1983,
at 9:00 o'clock a.m.
The Court has treated and will treat the motion of defendants, Perry
Fitzgerald and Carolyn S. Fitzgerald, for such order to show cause as a motion to
amend the Judgment entered on May 17, 1982.
The Court will also hear arguments, if any, as to whether or not the Court
should on its own initiative amend the Judgment with respect to the offer of defendants, Lee A. Fitzgerald and Helen Fitzgerald, referred to in the Court's Memorandum
Decision of May 4, 1982.
Any interested party to this action may appear and be heard, provided a
brief written statement of position is filed prior to the date of hearing and a
copy served upon all counsel.

cc:

Byron L. Stubbs, Esq.
Robert B. Hansen, Esq.
M. Dayle Jeffs, Esq.
David B. Boyce, Esq.
John C. Heaton, Esq.

Michael Mazuran, Esq,
Allen Swan, Esq.
S. Thomas Bowen, Esq.
Stanley R. Smith

PFrc.

i

]

mi
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PLAINTIFFS
EXHIBIT ,

NO.

*r

DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

BOYD CORBETT and KEITH GURR,
individuals, and UTAH RANCHLANDS,
a partnership,
Plaintiffs,

Civil No. 50224

vs.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT
LEE A. FITZGERALD and HELEN
FITZGERALD, his wife, PERRY
G. FITZGERALD and CAROLYN S.
FITZGERALD, his wife,
Defendants.

Pursuant to Rule 60(a), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, the Court amends, corrects and clarifies its
judgment in the following particulars:
1.

Plaintiffs allege that the Court erred in

its judgment entered June 25, 1982 by failing to order
defendant, Lee Fitzgerald, to perform according to his offer
to honor contracts between plaintiffs and innocent purchasers
of property covered under the May 13, 1978 Contract.
Language in the Memorandum Decision entered May
4, 1982 which apparently created the ambiguity as to whether
or not the Court intended to so order, was included in the
decision to encourage the defendant to perform according to
his unsolicited offer so as to minimize litigation and avoid
further loss and damage to innocent purchasers.

However,

defendant's offer had no bearing whatsoever on the decision

-2-

rendered by the Court, the decision was not conditioned
thereon, and the Court did not intend to assume responsibility
for supervising defendant's performance according to the
offer.

The Court, therefore, declines to alter its judgment

on the basis that the alleged omission constituted error,
oversight, or mistake.
2.

With regard to the March Contract, the Court

did err in its judgment entered May 17, 1982, relative to
unjust enrichment.

Upon a complete review of the matter the

Court finds that it erred in the following particulars:
(a)

The Court ordered the return of property which

plaintiffs received upon execution of the March Contract,
although the record shows plaintiffs had sold the property
to a third party;
(b)

The judgment failed to consider that plaintiffs

assumed a mortgage on the property they received approximating
$48,500.
Although the Court believes these oversights
should have been brought to its attention when the proposed
findings and judgment were submitted by counsel and not
months later after the parties entered into an agreement
resulting in the dismissal of an appeal to the Supreme Court,
the Court is now disposed, in the interests of justice, to
correct the judgment, nevertheless.
The Court does not alter its position that the
decision should be and is based upon the equitable principle
of unjust enrichment.

Specifically, it was.and-is the Court's

-3-

holding that plaintiffs who failed to perform according to
the terms of the contract should not be allowed to retain the
benefit of property for which they have not paid.

The Court

is likewise firm in its position that neither party is
entitled to enforce the contract according to its terms.
The measure of damages is, therefore, the value of the benefit
conferred upon plaintiffs which they unjustifiably retained,
not the amount required to place the parties in their precontract positions or the amount required to compensate the
defendant for the detriment incurred in providing the property.
For the purposes of doing equity as between the
parties, the Court finds upon a consideration of all of the
evidence that the benefit conferred upon the plaintiffs at
the time the contract was entered into was the sum of $125,000,
less the assumed debt in an amount of $48,500, making a net
benefit of $76,500.

This benefit valuation was arrived at

upon a consideration of all the evidence including the following:
1.

The price plaintiffs obtained in their subsequent

sale of the property;
2.

Testimony as to the accuracy of the contract price

as a reflection of either the value of the property plaintiffs
received or the value of the property they gave under the terms
of the contract;
3.

The provision of the contract relative to releases

and consideration for the down payment received by seller

-4-

in light of all the testimony and the contract taken as a
whole;
4.

The appraisals received into evidence; and,

5.

The price defendant paid to acquire the property

in 1974 plus testimony of improvements made and the general
condition of the property.
Plaintiffs unjustifiably retained only that
portion of the benefit conferred ($76,500) for which they had
not paid.

Therefore, since plaintiffs deeded 60 acres to

defendant, the $76,500 should be reduced by the reasonable
value of those 60 acres.

In the Courtfs opinion the reason-

able value of the 60 acres is $240 per acre for a total of
$14,400.

This amount was arrived at by adjusting downward

the total contract price for 2240 acres by the amount of the
inflation in the valuation of the property received ($175,^00),
and then dividing that adjusted price by the total number of
acres.

($716,800 - $175,500 = $541,300 ~ 2240 acres = approxi-

mately $240 per acre)
Subtracting the value of the 60 acres ($14,400)
from the value of the benefit conferred upon the plaintiffs
($76,500), the Court holds that plaintiffs were unjustly
enriched by a net of $62,100.

The Court also finds as a

matter of equity that defendant should receive legal interest
on that amount from the contract execution date of March 6,
1978.
The Judgment heretofore rendered on May 17, 1982

-5-

is amended, corrected and clarified in accordance with the
foregoing.
Further, it is Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed
that in lieu of the return of the apartment house and duplex
by plaintiffs, defendants, Perry G. Fitzgerald and Carolyn
S. Fitzgerald, do have and recover from plaintiffs the sum
of $62,100 together with interest thereon at the rate of
6% per annum from March 6, 1978 to May 14, 1981, and at the
rate of 107o per annum thereafter to the date hereof, and at
the rate of 12% per annum on the total principal and interest
from the date hereof until paid.
The parties shall bear their own costs and
attorneys fees.

^ ^

Dated this

/ /

—

BY THE COURT:

CC:

Byron L. Stubbs, Esq.
M. Dayle Jeffs, Esq.
Robert B. Hansen, Esq.
Allen M. Swan, Esq.
Michael J. Mazuran, Esq.

day of April, 1983.
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3
4
5

61

BYRON L. STUBBS
Attorney for Plaintiffs
530 East Fifth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
(801) 328-4207

7

DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY

81
91

STATE OF UTAH

BOYD CORBETT and KEITH GURR,
individuals, and UTAH RANCHLANDS,
101 a partnership,

11

121

Plaintiffs,
vs.

13 LEE A. FITZGERALD and HELEN
FITZGERALD, his wife, PERRY G.
141 FITZGERALD and CAROLYN S.
15
16
17

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Civil No. 50224

FITZGERALD, his wife,
Defendants.
Notice is hereby given that BOYD CORBETT and KEITH GURR,

18 individuals, and UTAH RANCHLANDS, a partnership, hereby appeal
19 to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah from the Order and

201

Judgment entered in this action on the 19th day of April, 1983,

21

in favor of LEE A. FITZGERALD and HELEN FITZGERALD, his wife,

221 as well as the judgment entered on the same date, to-wit: April
23

19, 1983, in favor of PERRY G. FITZGERALD and CAROLYN S. FITZ-

24

GERALD, his wife.

25

DATED:

May 17, 1983

26
27
28

(^^BYRON L. STUBBS
'"^ Attorney for Appellants
530 East Fifth South
Salt Lake City, Ut 84102

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Notice
was delivered by T.R.S., a delivery service, to:
M. Dayle Jeffs
Attorney for Defendants Fitzgerald
90 North 100 East, P.O. Box 683
Provo, Utah 84603
Michael J. Mazuran
Attorney for T.H. Bell
9 Exchange Place, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Ut 84111
David B. Boyce
Milton A. Oman
Attorneys for Richard & Jolen McKinney
61 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Ut 84111
Jon C. Heaton & Gordon Strachan
Attorneys for Helen Stassi & Johnell Yurka
424 East 500 South
Salt Lake City, Ut 84111
Allen M. Swan
Attorney for Sterling W. Sill
330 South Third East
Salt Lake City, Ut 84111
S. Thomas Bowen
Attorney for Dale Jones
36 South State St #200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Mr. Stanley Smith
2185 Monticello Drive
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83401
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April 17, 1984

11432

NOTICE OF INTEREST ON BEHALF OF CORBETT*S BUYERS WHEREAS . . .
1. Leland Fitzgerald and his attorney, Dale Jeffs, promises in open court
to honor all of CorbettYs sales "regardless of the amount paid" if Judge Robert
Bullock would rule in their favor.
2.

Judge Bullock has ruled in their favor.

3. About two years have passed now since Mr. Jeffs and Fitzgerald have made
their offer and to this day not one of Corbett's sales have been honored.
4.

Fitzgerald again reconfirmed his offer in a letter in November 1982.

5. Since Mr. Fitzgerald and Mr. Jeffs apparently have not the personal
Integrity of their spoken word in open court, Corbett hereby files a Notice of
Interest on some additional property that was overlooked, but still a bonafide sale on
behalf of his buyers. That property is described as follows:
All of Section'3 except the SW 1/4 of the NW 1/4.
The West 1/2 of Section 2.
The above in Township 8 South Range 2 West

5.L0/V

Also
The East 1/2 of Section 33 Township 7 South Range 2 West S.t$*.
Also
The NW1/4 of Section 31 Township 7 South Range 1 West Sk*>».
The South 1/2 of the SW 1/4 of Section 30 Township 7 South Range
1 West

$\$*L

The South 1/2 of the SW 1/4 and the North 1/2 of the NW 1/4 of
Section 18 Township 7 South, Range 1 West
tie*.
The NW 1/4 of Section 7 Township 7 South Range 1 WestSc£-i.
The West 1/2 of the NE 1/4 of Section 7 Township 7 South Range 1
West 5KC4.M*

The South 1/2 of the SW 1/4 of Section 7 Township 7 South Range 1
West ^ 4 * .
The South 1/2 of the SW 1/4 of Section 7 Township 7 South Range 1
West >c4*<

*

The West 1/2 of the SE 1/4 of Section 7 Township 7 South Range 1
West St 4M.

&?

<^

Boyd Cor
COUNTY OF UTAH )

:ss
STATE OF UTAH )

^^

. .
f
yl jfoy&*

SUBSCRIBED Alflf fwj$RN t S b ^ f < t e | i e t h i s / < £ c l a y of /2p4ol

My Commission Expires:

N^ary HID nc

*~lR«1d1ng * t :

"7T~

^ ^ ^

.
/

,

/JGT-

,•

'>

pVfc;v..
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Boyd CORBETT and Keith Gurr, individuals, and Utah Ranchlands, a
partnership, Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
Lee A. FITZGERALD and Helen Fitzgerald, his wife, Perry G. Fitzgerald and
Carolyn S. Fitzgerald, his wife, et al.v
Defendants and Respondents.
No. 19225.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Nov. 1, 1985.
In case involving various real estate
transactions among parties, judgment was

CORBETT v. FITZGERALD

Utah

385

Cite at 709 P.2d 384 (Uuh 19SS)

red for both defendants I and defendIl^gnd plaintiffs appealed. Both aps were dismissed with prejudice. Deants II filed motion to amend original
ment between plaintiffs and defendII on basis that plaintiff? had disposed
»al property ordered to be reconveyed
iefendants II. The Fourth District
t, Utah County, J. Robert Bullock, J.,
•ed money judgment in lieu of its origiudgment of reconveyance in favor of
idants II. Plaintiffs appealed. The
erne Court, Timothy R. Hanson, DisJudge, held that amendment of origijudgment allowing money damages
r than reconveyance was proper.
Affirmed.
tpeal and Error *=*1097(1), 1195(1)
]xpres8 ruling by appellate court on
>ues raised by prior appeals is binding
parties, trial court, and appellate
in subsequent appeal.
dgment <&=»314
amendment of original judgment
had provided for reconveyance of
Droperty, to allow award of money
£es where real property could not be
yeyed due to disposal of property to
parties, was proper, where basis uti>y trial court in determining approprioney damages was supported by eviRules Civ.Proc., Rule 60(bX7).
on L. Stubbs, Salt Lake City, for
ffs and appellants.
Dayle Jeffs, Provo, Robert B. Hanfichael J. Mazuran, David B. Boyce
Lilton A. Oman, Jon C. Heaton and
n Strachan, Allen M. Swan, K. Thomwen, Salt Lake City, for defendants
spondents.
OTHY R. HANSON, District Judge:
case, which is before the Court a
time, involves various real estate
ctions among the parties regarding
ty located in Cedar Valley, Utah.
rst appeal was from the original
24-10

judgment entered by the trial court following-a trial where -both, plaintiff*-and defendants' reciprocal claims were considered. The parties' status as appellants
or respondents does not change in this subsequent appeal. The first appeal was tak-r
en by plaintiffs Corbett, Gurr, and Utah
Ranchlands from judgments entered by the
trial court on May 17, 1982, and June 29,
1982. Plaintiffs appealed from judgments
for both defendants Lee A. Fitzgerald and
Helen Fitzgerald (hereinafter "defendants
I") and defendants Perry G. Fitzgerald and
Carolyn S. Fitzgerald (hereinafter "defendants II"). Both appeals were dismissed
with prejudice by the Court on November
1, 1982. Corbett v. Fitzgerald, Utah, No.
18529, appeal dismissed (Nov. 1, 1982);
Corbett v. Fitzgerald, Utah, No. 18594,
appeal dismissed Nov. 1, 1982).
Subsequent to this Court's dismissal of
the original appeals, defendants II brought
before the trial court a motion seeking an
order requiring plaintiffs to appear and
show cause why the original judgment between plaintiffs and defendants II should
not be amended and corrected. The nature
of the requested amendment and correction
was to enter an award of money damages
to defendants II against plaintiffs rather
than the original order and judgment of
reconveyance that had been entered by the
trial court in its May 17, 1982 judgment
The basis for the motion for an order to
show cause was that the real property
could not be reconveyed inasmuch as plaintiffs had disposed of the property to third
parties. An order to show cause was issued, and several hearings were held by
the trial court Following the hearings, the
trial court found that plaintiffs could not
reconvey, and after receiving testimony regarding the value of the properties, the
trial court entered a money judgment in
lieu of its original judgment of reconveyance in favor of defendants II and against
plaintiffs.
In addition to the foregoing, the trial
court at the conclusion of the hearings
entered certain orders clarifying the basis
for its earlier June 29,1982 judgment as to

386
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defendants If, butjdid not disturb the origiWe direct our attention to the nature^
*lKetnal^<561irt%^rde^f April l^m
nal judgment *
[I] In the present appeal, plaintiffs whether the amendment of the orig
seek to resurrect the issues that were judgment to allow an award of money da
raised in the first appeal. The assignments ages against plaintiffs was proper unci
of error in plaintiffs' brief are directed the circumstances. We treat the order^
toward the original judgments, the same one issued in response to a motion brouglj
judgments from which plaintiffs appealed under Rule 60(b)(7) of the Utah Rules $
in Corbett v. Fitzgerald, Nos. 18529 and Civil Procedure. This Court will revfc
18594, supra. This Court declines now to the trial court's ruling only when there \
consider those original appeal issues, inas- been an abuse of discretion. See LarserF\
much as those issues and their appeals Collina, Utah, 684 P.2d 52, 54 (1984).
were dismissed with prejudice. The order
to show cause hearings held subsequent to
plaintiffs' original appeals to this Court do
not provide an occasion for plaintiffs to
now appeal the results of those hearings
and include in the instant appeal those issues that were raised and dismissed in the
original appeals. The express ruling by
this Court on all issues raised by the prior
appeals is binding upon the parties, the
trial court, and this Court C & J Industries, Inc. v. Bailey, Utah, 669 P.2d 855,
856 (1983). Plaintiffs' claims of error as to
the original judgments were dismissed by
this Court with prejudice. That dismissal
constitutes an affirmance of the original
judgments, and they are not subject to
further attack in a subsequent appeal.1
The only question properly before this
Court now is whether the actions of the
trial court following the order to show
cause hearings, specifically the trial court's
order and judgment of April 19,1983, were
appropriate. Those actions and the amendment of the original judgment only deal
with plaintiffs and defendants II. Plaintiffs accepted the sum of $4,709.96 from
defendants I and released their judgment
against them. That judgment is therefore
not reviewable on appeal. See Ottenheimer v. Mountain States Supply Co., 56
Utah 190, 193-94, 188 P. 1117, 1118 (1920).
1. Rule 76(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (repealed), in effect during these appeals,
reads as follows:
Effect of dismissal of an appeal. The dismissal of an appeal is in effect an affirmance of
the judgment or order appealed from, unless
the dismissal is expressly made without prejudice to another appeal.

[2] Plaintiffs' brief on appeal cont
no claim of error as to the trial cou
actions at the order to show cause he
ings. This Court's independent review re.,
veals no error by the trial court. Tra!
original judgment ordered reconveyance**
the real properties at issue. Since
real properties had been disposed of,
plaintiffs to third parties, making it imjtf:
sible for plaintiffs to comply, an amej
ment of the original judgment in favoi;
defendants II allowing money damage
rather than reconveyance, was appropriate
The basis utilized by the trial court in ~
termining an appropriate money damag
award is supported by the evidence afi<j
was well within his discretion.
To the extent that the issues are propet
before us, the trial court's order is^**
firmed.
HALL, CJ., and DURHAM, STEW/
and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur.
HOWE, J., having disqualified hk
does not participate herein; TIM01
HANSON, District Judge, sat

a>

O S (IV MJMMt SYSTEM,
2 ^"^p^A^V

See generally Prudential Federal Sav. A 14$*^
Ass'n v. St. Paul Ins. Cos., 22 Utah 2d 70^
P.2d 724 (1968); Gammon v. Federated *
Producers Ass'n, 14 Utah 2d 291, 383 ?2d:
(1963); Davis v. Payne & Day, Inc., 12 Uti
107. 363 P.2d 498 (1961); Helper State t
Cms, 95 Utah 320. 81 P.2d 359 (1938).

ADDENDUM NO.

19

PLAINTIFF'S
EXHIBIT

REAL ESTATE CONTRACT

NO.

THIS AGREEMENT, made this

-27_th

betwecn

.e.u_.Bp.yd..C_qrb_et_t

nd

DalfiJL_Beus..

1

day of

., 19&-L-

Ma£-

, hereinafter called the seller.
_, hereinafter called the buyer.

WITNESSETH, That in consideration of the stipulations herein contained, and the payments to be made as hereinafter specified;
the seller agrees to sell unto the buyer, and the buyer agrees to purchase from the pellet the following described real property situated
in the County o/._ U t a h
_
State of liWCSKfiCgGK. and more particularly \nown and described

is follows to-wiv

North %.of t h e S.W. \ of S e c t i o n 3 0 ^ X o ^ ? M P - X S 9 ^ ? J > .

Ran^O.JjAL-_i.-.kiLI

or the sum of

. Dollars

LQ,_Q.Q

n which the buyer has paid the sum of

JLJ.Q.0..

dollar*, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged.
And the buyer, in consideration of the premises, hereby agrees to pay to the seller, at
IL±J±e
the remaining principal, with interest at the rate of
io.„.
per cent, per annum, at the time* and in the manner following:

Balanc^jiLl§-.Sje£t^mber J L 5 ^ J ^ J | i

And the buyer, in contideration of the premitet,

hereby agrees to regularly and teatonably pay all taxet and attettmentt

which may be hereafter lawfully Un-

fed on laid premitet, and fceep buildings intured againtt lott by fire in a reliable inturance company in the turn of $ — . . _ _ _ _ . . . . _ . . — — . — — — — — —
the seller at hit interest may appear.

payable

All improvement! placed thereon shall remain, and shall not be removed be/ore the final payment it made at above agrekd.
In cote the buyer, his Ugat representatives or assigns, shall pay the several sums of money aforesaid punctually and at the several times above specified, and shall
Utly and hterally perform all and singular, the agreements and stipulations aforetaid, according to the true intent and tenor hereof, then the teller will mal(e unto the
yer, his heir* or attignt, upon request, a deed conveying taid premitet in fee timpfe, with the usual covenants of warranty, excepting, however, from the operation
i subject matter of said covenants the be/ore mentioned taxes and attettmentt, and all lient and incumbrances, created or impoted by the buyer or hit attignt.
But in cote the buyer shall make default in any way of the covenantt herein contained or shall fail to ma\e the paymenu aforetaid, or any of them punctually
I upon the strict terms, and at the time above specified, without any failure or default, the times of payment being declared to be the ettence of this agreement, then
seller shall have the right to declare this agreement null and void, and in such case, all the rights and interettt hereby created or then existing in favor of the buyer,
derived under this agreement, shall utterly cease and determine, and the premises aforetaid shall revert to and revest in the seller, without any declaration of forfeiture,
act of reentry, or without any other act by the seller to be performed, and without any right of the buyer of reclamation or compensation for money paid or im*
wements made, at absolutely, fully and perfectly at \f this agreement had never been made.
The teller hereby agrees to furnish to the buyer, or hit assigns, a policy of title insurance or a complete abstract of title to the within described premises, certified
a responsible abstract company,
AND TT IS FURTHER AGREED, That no astignment of this agreement, or of the premitet above described, shall be valid unless the tame shall be endorted
eon or permanently attached hereto and countersigned by the seller, and no agreement or condition or relationt between thfe buyer and hit assignee, or any other
son, acquiring title or interest from or through him shall preclude the seller from the right to convey the prenuset to tHe buyer or hit attignt, on the payment of
unpaid portion of the purchase money which may be due to the teller.
Abstract or title inturance and fire insurance policiet to remain in possession of the teller until final payment it made.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, The seller and buyer have signed and delivered this agreement in duplicate^thc day and year first above
tten.

Witnesses

.—JL^SSeller.

Buyer.
ESTATE CONTRACT

